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JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE: PRECEDENT, POLITICS AND POWER
Stephen B. Burbank*
Judge Arnold was proud of his ancestry, and sometimes had to be re-
minded by his brother, Morris Sheppard Arnold, also a United States
Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, that "those who talk too much about
their ancestors are like potatoes: their best parts are underground."'
No doubt it expands the ego of a judge to look upon himself as the
guardian of the general future. But his more humble yet more important
and immediate task is to decide individual, actual, present, cases ...
Such judicial legislation as inheres in formulating legal rules is inescap-
able. But courts should be modest in their legislative efforts to control
the future ... The future can become as perniciously tyrannical as the
past. Posterity-worship can be as bad as ancestor-worship.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a great pleasure to participate in this Symposium honoring Richard
Arnold. As Richard said, "I know that this is a great law school, because
you have invited me to speak.",3 I did not know Richard well, but I consid-
ered him a friend. Although I will often refer to him hereafter as "Judge
Arnold," particularly in these parts it can be confusing to do so. That is be-
cause Senator Hatch was not entirely consistent in his views about appoint-
ing judges from the same family. When administrations had changed, he
said that the practice "smacks of elitism ... concentration of familial con-
trol, ' 4 which prompted Senator Kennedy to remark, "I don't know what's
wrong with a familial concentration of power."5
© Stephen B. Burbank 2005
* David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania.
Stephen Barnett, Edward Becker, Barry Friedman, Charles Geyh, Edward Hartnett, Andrew
Kaufman, Louis Pollak, Patrick Schiltz, David Shapiro, Catherine Struve, and Stephen
Wasby provided helpful comments on a draft. Gregory Cooper, Penn Law Class of 2007,
provided excellent research assistance.
1. Obituary, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 24, 2004, at 8B.
2. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 287-88 (1949) (quoting Aero Spark Plug Co. v.
B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 295-96 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
3. Richard S. Arnold, The Future of the Federal Courts, 60 Mo. L. REv. 533 (1995)
[hereinafter Future]. See also Richard S. Arnold, The Federal Courts: Causes of Discontent,
56 SMU L. REv. 767, 768 (2003) [hereinafter Discontent].
4. Joan Biskupic, Panel Votes on Mother-Son Judgeships; Professor Approved after
Liberal Parent Agrees to Semi-Retirement, WASH. POST, May 17, 1996, at A3.
5. Id.
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Although I would like to think that I was selected to participate in this
symposium on merit,6 my presence here is better explained by what Richard
referred to as "cronyism, one of the values that has made America great."7
The other judge in the family, Richard's brother Morris-the one whose
name Senator Hatch evidently thought was Arnold Morris-was once my
colleague and has been a good friend to me and my family for more than
twenty years.
Writing about judges can be a tricky business, particularly for one who
believes that nil nisi bonum is not an appropriate scholarly predisposition
about anyone or anything, dead or alive.8 It is particularly challenging for
one who is tired of the platitudes so long and so often voiced about judicial
independence and accountability in the legal literature. My response has
been to seek refreshment in scholarship that is informed by other disci-
plines, 9 a perspective that may help readers to understand why I chose the
two facets of Richard Arnold's career I discuss in this article and also what I
have to say about them. I first take up Judge Arnold's efforts to curtail the
use of alternatives to the traditional model of appellate decisionmaking,
including his opinion for a panel of the Eighth Circuit in the Anastasoff
case.' 0 I then consider the role that politics played in his life as a judge.11
6. See Richard S. Arnold, Money, or the Relations of the Judicial Branch with the
Other Two Branches, Legislative and Executive, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 19, 22 (1995-96) [here-
inafter Money] ("I was, in fact, appointed by the Chief Justice to this position precisely be-
cause I had been a legislative assistant to Senator Bumpers, who was then and still is a mem-
ber of our Appropriations Subcommittee. I was appointed on merit, the same way I became a
Federal judge."); Richard S. Arnold, Judges and the Public, LITIG., Summer 1983, at 6 ("my
merit, incidentally was that I was a friend of a senator") [hereinafter Public].
7. Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 267, 268 (1997) [hereinafter Madison].
8. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination
and Ideology in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1971 (1997) [hereinafter
Burbank 1].
9. Thus, the need I felt for insight into the psychology and motivations of judges led
me to the work of Jermone Frank. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 2, and Richard Posner. See,
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995). The perception that the legal literature
contained very little of use on issues of judicial independence and accountability in state
courts led me to the political science literature for a 1999 article on the architecture of judi-
cial independence. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72
S. CAL. L. REv. 315, 331-35 (1999) [hereinafter Burbank 11]. And the knowledge resulting
from that work and from discussions with Barry Friedman that there was not one literature
on judicial independence and accountability but a variety of literatures, and that they were
like ships passing in the night, led us to organize an interdisciplinary conference in 2001,
which in turn yielded our co-edited book. See JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, eds. 2002) (here-
inafter JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS)
10. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot on reh 'g en banc, 235
F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
11. The experience of broadening my horizons on judicial independence and judicial
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A consideration of Judge Arnold's judicial and extrajudicial writings
about alternatives to traditional appellate decisionmaking reveals that for
him such practices represented a threat to judicial accountability, and hence
to judicial independence, in two dimensions. First, by loosening the re-
straints of precedent and of the common law method of making law, they
can dilute the judiciary's accountability to the past. Second, as a result of
the processes used to determine which cases will be handled at which tier of
appellate decisionmaking, norms concerning the care with which they will
be handled, the division of labor in handling them, and rules about prece-
dential status, dissemination and citation of decisions, alternatives to tradi-
tional appellate decisionmaking can dilute the judiciary's accountability to
the present and the future. The empirical basis for trust in the federal courts
of appeals not to manipulate the system is equivocal, and empirical support
is probably of secondary importance in these days, when the courts are the
center of partisan and issue-oriented political attention and controversy.
Moreover, the alternatives in place in some circuits implicate the account-
ability of district courts, rendering appellate review an ever more impotent
check on unacceptable judicial independence, and sending misleading sig-
nals to those litigants, district courts and academics who, in planning their
behavior, making decisions and monitoring the courts, pay attention only to
that which tradition taught them to regard as important.
Consideration of Judge Arnold's attitudes towards the politics of judg-
ing and the politics of the federal judiciary reveals not a sharp dichotomy
between law and politics, but rather a keen sense of the importance of re-
straint in the exercise of judicial power and a commitment not to abstrac-
tions but to people. Judge Arnold recognized that institutional self-
aggrandizement is inimical to the long-term ability of the federal courts to
accomplish the roles envisioned for them in the Constitution, as he did the
importance of respectful relations with the legislature and the executive. His
was the politics of statesmanship and dialogue, a politics that is hard to see
accountability was sufficiently stimulating that I have been pursuing the same path in other
work. Power has been my dominant concern as a scholar of federal practice and procedure
for more than twenty years. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982) [hereinafter Burbank II1]; Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure
and Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513 (1996) [hereinafter Burbank IV]. For most of that time,
however, I proceeded without systematically considering the literature that is centrally con-
cerned with power: that of political science. I have recently sought to fill that gap, and the
first installment of this work was published last year. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Poli-
tics, and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1677 (2004) [hereinafter
Burbank V]. I am currently studying the role of interest groups in court rulemaking. William
Howard Taft and Charles Clark, polar opposites politically but dancing cheek to cheek in
their efforts to empower the judiciary through rulemaking, are spinning in their graves. See
Burbank IV, supra, at 513.
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in some of the current decisions of the Supreme Court, let alone in the ongo-
ing debate about no-citation rules in the federal court of appeals.
Both facets of Judge Arnold's career reveal a person aware of the fra-
gility of the independence of the federal judiciary and of the need for federal
courts to be accountable-to litigants, to the other institutions of govern-
ment and to other courts-if they are to continue to be able to fulfill their
historic functions. Richard Arnold knew that, whatever scholars may say
about the evanescence of distinctions between interpretation and lawmak-
ing, judges who are eager lawmakers put at risk the reservoir of good will-
or as he put it, the "continuing consent of the governed" 2 -upon which the
judiciary must draw when hard decisions are not merely satisfying but nec-
essary.
They reveal as well a person of surpassing intelligence and learning,
from a privileged background, who nonetheless eschewed both the theory of
the leisure class and the leisure of the theory class, and who was as confi-
dent of his own abilities as he was of the fact that judicial appointment does
not confer moral superiority. 13 In sum, they reveal the sort of judge of
whom the federal judiciary has too few today, a time when the degradation
of politics cries out for the qualities of patience, humility, and the willing-
ness to engage in genuine dialogue that Richard Arnold exemplified.
II. TIERED APPELLATE DECISIONMAKING
For more than twenty years, in speeches, articles, and one famous
opinion,14 Judge Arnold elaborated the reasons for his opposition to prac-
tices of federal appellate courts in disposing of cases by means other than
the traditional signed, published, and precedential opinion.' 5 His was not the
12. Public, supra note 6, at 5. See id. ("and if we lose that consent for very long among
a very large percentage of the governed then we are in deep trouble"); Richard S. Arnold,
Judicial Politics Under President Washington, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 473, 478 (1996) [hereinafter
Judicial Politics] ("if their opinions and orders are not ultimately entitled to respect, they
will, in the long run, not be obeyed, either because of open defiance or because of private
evasion"). Judge Arnold was referring to what political scientists call "diffuse support," that
is support for the institution whether or not one agrees with particular decisions. See DAVID
EASTON, A SYSTEMS APPROACH OF POLITICAL LIFE 273 (1965); Gregory A. Caldeira & James
L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 635,
637 (1992).
13. Public, supra note 6, at 5 ("The holding of a commission signed by the president
does not in and of itself confer moral superiority").
14. See, e.g., id at 6; Future, supra note 3, at 537-38; Discontent, supra note 3, at 777-
80. The question decided in Anastasoffwas raised in a short article published the year before.
See Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219,
226 (1999) ("In other words, is the assertion that unpublished opinions are not precedent and
cannot be cited a violation of Article III?") [hereinafter Unpublished Opinions].
15. In referring here and elsewhere to a "traditional" model of appellate decisionmak-
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only note of alarm raised, as scholars and practitioners joined the chorus,' 6
and defenders of non-traditional dispositions, within and without the judici-
ary, took up the challenge to justify what the courts of appeals were doing. 7
In the last two decades, these practices have become more common,
and although both the frequency of departures, and the precise details of the
modes of departure, from the traditional model vary among the circuits, it is
safe to say that continued invocation of that model in describing the work of
federal appellate courts can be as misleading as invoking the model of trial
can be in describing the work of district courts.' 8 In any event, grouping the
ing, I do not mean to suggest that it was the model contemplated by the architects of the
federal judiciary or that it has been practiced from the beginning of the Republic. Thus, for
instance, systematically produced and distributed opinions are a nineteenth century develop-
ment. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv. 123, 127-30 (1999): Lest it appear, however, that I am thus taking sides in
the debate about the implications of Article III for the use of nonprecedential opinions, see
infra text accompanying notes 22-25, I should make four points. First, the status of opinions
at the time of the framing is hardly dispositive of the question whether a nonprecedential
judgment is consistent with Article III. Professor Hartnett reminds us that "[i]t is the judg-
ment, not the opinion, that 'settle[s] authoritatively what is to be done'-and the only thing
the judgment settles authoritatively is what is to be done about the particular case or contro-
versy for which the judgment was made." Hartnett, supra, at 128 (footnotes omitted). He
took no position, however, on "questions surrounding the duty of courts to adhere to prece-
dent." Id. at 132 n.50 (emphasis in original). Second, as Professor Price reminds us,
"[alccording to Anastasoff, courts are free to overrule or distinguish precedent, but they are
not free to ignore it entirely." Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Found-
ing, 42 B.C. L. REv. 81, 85 (2000). See id at 105 ("[W]e tend to conflate the ideas of prece-
dent and stare decisis. The two are not entirely the same, however."). See also Stephen R.
Barnett, From Anastasoff to West 's Federal Appendix: The Ground Shiftt Under No-Citation
Rules, 4 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 9-12 (2002). Third, as indicated below, the implications
of Article III for tiered appellate decisionmaking is not the question that interests me for
present purposes. Fourth, even if it were, I would not rest with an originalist view of those
implications, particularly in light of changes over time in the role and structure of the federal
judiciary.
Note that Judge Arnold also expressed concern about the decline in the number of
cases decided after oral argument. See Future, supra note 3, at 537. For the relationship
between oral argument and publication, see Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the
Federal Courts of Appeals: Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 325,
332-33 (2001) (Ninth Circuit data for 1998 "show that publication occurs in forty percent of
orally-argued cases but in only three percent of those submitted on the briefs").
16. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opin-
ions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REv. 940
(1989); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 273 (1996); Law-
rence J. Fox, Those Unpublished Opinions: An Appropriate Expedience or an Abdication of
Responsibility?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1215 (2004).
17. See, e.g., Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 177 (1999); Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the Judicial
Power to "Unpublish" Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 135 (2001).
18. See Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control. The Limits of Data
2005]
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practices under the term "unpublished opinions" is certainly misleading 9
because advances in technology have enabled, and the E-government Act of
200220 now requires, the on-line availability of most opinions that are not
published in bound volumes 21 because practices vary concerning the status
of such opinions as precedent and the permissibility of citing them and be-
cause in any event nontraditional opinions do not exhaust the means by
which today's appellate courts depart from the traditional model. For those
reasons, I prefer the term "tiered appellate decisionmaking.
22
Most discussions of tiered appellate decisionmaking have been tradi-
tional legal discourse consisting of policy arguments and, where facts might
help (or get in the way), armchair empiricism. It is very hard to "win" such
an argument, which may help to explain why Judge Arnold came ultimately
to the position that Article III courts must heed (that is, treat as precedent)
and Inference in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal
Court, 1 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 571, 585 (2004) [hereinafter Burbank VI] (referring to "federal
judges at first instance" because "'trial judges have gone the way of 'trial lawyers"').
19. See Unpublished Opinions, supra note 14, at 219-20; Barnett, supra note 15, at 2
(publication of Federal Appendix "a startling action that drains the meaning from the terms
'unpublished' opinion"). For current practices see J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Legal Fiction of
the "Unpublished" Kind- The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the Ethical Duty of
Candor, 1 SETON HALL CIR. REv. 27, 98-99 (2005) (App. I). For the view that technological
advances have not solved the problem of effective access to the lower tiers, particularly for
those with limited resources, see Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of
Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1435, 1465-68 (2004).
20. Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §
3501). Federal courts are now required to establish and maintain websites that "provide
access to the substance of all written opinions issued by the court, regardless of whether such
opinions are to be published in the official court reporter, in a text searchable format." Id.
The official guidance provided by the Judicial Conference defines "written opinion" as "any
document issued by a judge or judges of the court, sitting in that capacity that sets forth a
reasoned explanation for a court's decision." Memorandum on Compliance with Website
Requirements of the E-Government Act to All Chief Judges, United State Courts, from
Leonidas Ralph Mecham 2 (Nov. 10, 2004) (on-file with author). The guidance further pro-
vides that "[iun the courts of appeals, only those documents designated as opinions of the
court meet the definition of 'written opinion."' Id. As of April 2005 nineteen of nearly 200
federal courts throughout the country reported that they were deferring compliance with the
Act's requirements as to the accessibility of written opinions in some respect. See Federal
Courts Respond to E-Government Act, THE THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 2005, at 7.
21. Moreover, starting a few years ago many "unpublished opinions" have been avail-
able in bound volumes. See West's Federal Appendix: Cases Argued and Determined in the
United States Courts of Appeals (2001). See Barnett, supra note 15, at 2-3.
22. The argument that forcing courts to permit citation of all opinions might cause more
of them to rely more heavily on judgment orders (no opinion) suggests that we should imag-
ine a hierarchy of appellate dispositions. See Lee & Lehnhof, supra note 17, at 150; id at
146 ("hierarchy of authority"). For a compromise position calling for the use of short pub-
lished opinions, see Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-
Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755 (2001). See also infra note 81 (proposals to
deal with rules making a panel decision binding unless overruled by court en banc).
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prior decisions, whatever label is attached to them. Although Judge Ar-
nold's opinion in Anastasoff v. United States23 and the court's judgment
were vacated as moot,24 the case has stimulated great interest. It also evi-
dently made some judges who do not share Judge Arnold's legal or policy
views nervous, prompting a panel of the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Kozinski in Hart v. Massanari,25 to respond in detail to Judge Ar-
nold's central constitutional claim.
More interesting, I believe, than who is right about the implications of
26* hArticle III for this question, is the window that the discussion opens on
conceptions of the judicial role. Moreover, once one takes the inquiry in that
direction, it becomes apparent that the issues involve judicial independence
and judicial accountability in ways both obvious and subtle.
In my prior work I have sought to demonstrate that judicial account-
ability is merely the other side of the coin from judicial independence (that
the two are not at war with each other but rather complements); that neither
is an end in itself but rather a means to an end (or variety of ends); that, at
least with respect to federal arrangements, the relevant ends relate not pri-
marily to individual judicial performance but rather to the performance of
courts and the court system; and that there is no one ideal mix of independ-
ence and accountability but rather that the right mix depends upon the goals
of those responsible for institutional architecture with respect to a particular
court or court system.27
From these premises one can derive a number of propositions about
judicial accountability that may be helpful in considering tiered appellate
decisionmaking. The first proposition is that judicial accountability has as
many roles to play as does judicial independence. As a result, judicial ac-
countability should serve to moderate what would otherwise be unaccept-
able decisional independence (i.e., decisions unchecked by law as it is gen-
erally understood or, in the case of inferior courts, by the prospect or reality
23. 223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot on reh'gen banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
24. Id.
25. 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
26. See supra note 15.
27. See Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence,
in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 9; Stephen B. Burbank, What Do
We Mean by "Judicial Independence"?, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 323 (2003) [hereinafter Burbank
VII]; Burbank II, supra note 9.
And finally, we must recognize that there is no single "problem of global ac-
countability"; there are many. The point is not to design a comprehensive, ideal
accountability system but, rather, to figure out how to limit abuses of power in a
world with a wide variety of power-wielders and without a centralized govern-
ment.
Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability andAbuses of Power in World Politics,
99 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 29, 41 (2005).
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of appellate review). In addition, judicial accountability should moderate
other judicial behavior (i.e., besides manifestations of "unacceptable deci-
sional independence") that would be considered hostile to or inconsistent
with the ability of courts to achieve the role(s) envisioned for them in the
particular polity (for example, as to federal judges, conduct that is "prejudi-
cial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts").
2 8
The second proposition is that, just as independence must be conceived
in relation to other actors (independence from whom or what?), so must
accountability (accountability to whom or what?). As a result, judicial ac-
countability should run to (1) the public, including litigants whose disputes
courts resolve, lawyers and those in law schools and other parts of the acad-
emy who critically appraise the judicial work product, (2) the people's rep-
resentatives, whose laws the courts interpret and apply, and (3) courts and
the judiciary as an institution. In each instance, proper regard for the other
side of the coin requires that accountability not entail influence that is
deemed to be undue.
Habit originally prompted me to say "the political branches" instead of
"the people's representatives." That would have been unfortunate on this
occasion for two reasons. First, my colleague Edward Rubin has made a
powerful argument that preoccupation with judicial independence (or ac-
countability) perpetuates an arboreal (that is, three branch) view of a land-
scape that was forever altered by the advent of the administrative state. Ac-
cording to Rubin, the independence/accountability problem is common to
institutional architecture and should be so conceived.29 Second, one need
not (and I do not) accept the view that there are no differences between
judges and the members of the legislature or executive30 to believe that the
traditional distinction between the judiciary and the "political branches" can
be, at least in this context and even as to federal judges, tendentious.
Since, however, some judges are, at least for some purposes, some
people's "representatives, 31 the distinction might be thought vulnerable
because (in part) not a distinction at all. Judges accountable to judges? Well,
yes, insofar as both courts and the judiciary as an institution are composed
28. 28 U.S.C. § 351 (2000).
29. See Edward L. Rubin, Independence as a Governance Mechanism, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 56. See also Grant & Keohane, supra
note 27, at 42.
30. "[M]any members of the public seem to feel- that judges are just politicians in an-
other guise. Sometimes some of us are, but we should not be." Future, supra note 3, at 545.
Cf Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 569-70 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("It
will need more than the Nineteenth Amendment to convince me that there are no differences
between men and women... ").
31. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
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of judges. Apart from the important role that judicial self-discipline plays in
ensuring the necessary "reservoir of good will, '32 a measure of accountabil-
ity is necessary to courts with respect to judicial decisions and to the judici-
ary with respect to non-decisional behavior. I have sought to make my claim
in that regard clear by adding "courts and the judiciary as an institution" as
a discrete category to which judicial accountability should run.
It appears to be the view of some who defend the turn to tiered appel-
late decisionmaking that (1) there is a carving joint between error correction
and lawmaking, and (2) error correction is a role having no effect on, and of
no interest to, any one other than the parties. I shall take up the first proposi-
tion shortly. As to the second, perhaps that is why Judge Kozinski views
"[a]n unpublished disposition [a]s, more or less, a letter from the court to
parties familiar with the facts, announcing the result and the essential ra-
tionale of the court's decision."33 If so, this view appears to me to reflect an
impoverished conception of judicial accountability. Where it prevails the
public must take it on trust either that (a) appellate courts would not ma-
nipulate the processes of tiered decisionmaking to reach results that are not
in accord with the law as generally understood or would not do so often
enough to prompt concern, 34 or that (b) other judges, the parties, their law-
yers and others who have access to the fruits of the lower tiers will be able
(and have the incentive) to blow the whistle.35
Having noted the possibility of such manipulation, Judge Arnold was
at pains to express his personal confidence that it would not occur. 36 In addi-
tion, published and forthcoming qualitative empirical research by Professor
Stephen Wasby affords an independent basis for some comfort. 37 Yet, nei-
32. Supra text accompanying note 12. See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Inde-
pendent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 962 (2002).
33. Hart, 266 F.3dat 1178.
34. Compare the Supreme Court's manipulation of its formally mandatory appellate
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (dismissing appeal from
conviction for violating anti-miscegenation statute); Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Cer-
tiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1643, 1709 (2000).
35. Note that we cannot rely on most law professors to serve as academic whistleblow-
ers because of the tenacity of their reliance on published opinions. See infra text accompany-
ing note 53.
36. See, e.g., Unpublished Opinions, supra note 14, at 223; Future, supra note 3, at 537.
37. In asserting that "[s]ufficient restrictions on judicial decisionmaking exist to allay
fears of irresponsible and unaccountable practices such as 'burying' inconvenient decisions
through nonpublication," Hart, 266 F.3d at 1177 n.35, Judge Kozinski cited, together with
another source, an article by Professor Wasby appearing in 2001. See Wasby, supra note 15.
That preliminary work in fact provides little evidence justifying the judge's assurance. I have
had the benefit of reading two additional and more recent articles by Professor Wasby that
are richer in every respect and, although hardly uncritical, more reassuring. See Stephen L.
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ther is a wholly satisfactory response. For, the results of the few quantitative
empirical studies that have included lower tier opinions suggest possible
reasons for concern about the fairness with which some litigants are treated
in tiered appellate decisionmaking, and about the accuracy of a number of
premises on which its practices are justified or defended.38 They thus flag
the need for more such research (as well as for more qualitative research), at
least if one is really interested in bringing experience to bear on policy and
can resist "the inclination of most mortals ... to dismiss the results of em-
pirical investigation that do not conform to their preconceptions."
39
In any event, confidence in commitment to the integrity of law on the
part of judges may not necessarily be shared by members of the public, even
those who are reasonable and reasonably well informed. That is a risk at a
time when the judiciary has again become a political football,40 thought by
some to play on a field indistinguishable from those on which aspirants for
judicial office all but make campaign promises on legal issues41 and by oth-
Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at the Process 14 S. CAL.
INTERDIsc. 67 (2004) [hereinafter Process]; Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Dispositions:
Are the Criteria Followed?, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV. _ (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter
Criteria].
38. See Donald R. Songer et al., Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical
Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 963 (1989); Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of
Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73
JuDicATuRE 307 (1990); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law:
What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND L. REV. 71
(2001).
This literature is reviewed in Process, supra note 37, at 76-79. See also Cappalli,
supra note 22, at 791-92; David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publica-
tion, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CiN. L. REV. 817 (2005). For arguments that
tiered appellate decisionmaking had a disparate impact on "those most in need of judicial
protection," see Richman & Reynolds, supra note 16, at 295-97, 316; Pether, supra note 19,
passim.
39. Burbank VI, supra note 18, at 573.
40. This is hardly the first time, and it surely will not be the last. See, e.g., WILLIAM G.
Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE
COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994). But the situation today seems unusually dangerous because
charges (or efforts to persuade the public) that judges are part of ordinary politics are con-
joined with efforts to enlist them in ordinary politics. See, e.g., An Act for the Relief of the
Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). The reported
reaction of Richard Viguerie, "the strategist behind conservative direct mailings," to the
district court's denial of relief in the lawsuit brought under this statute, was: "It is very dra-
matic proof of what we have been saying: that the judiciary is out of control." Carl Hulse &
David D. Kirkpatrick, Casting Angry Eye on Courts, Conservatives Prime for Bench-
Clearing Brawl in Congress, N.Y. TIMEs, March 23, 2005, at AI5. I certainly hope so. See
infra text accompanying note 128 (distinguishing influence from control). The question is
how long that will be true. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 27, at 32.
41. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Dale Wetzel, North
Dakota Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech Ruled Unconstitutional, Assoc. PRESS,
Mar. 23, 2005, at 1.
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ers to be represented by Bush v. Gore.2 Which is to say that Judge Arnold's
frank discussions of what a lawless court could do under a regime of tiered
appellate decisionmaking-to say nothing of his comments about per cu-
riam opinions--do not shock in a country that has seen a presidential elec-
tion decided by a per curiam one way ticket.43
Finally, in this aspect-and here we can perhaps discern the most im-
portant lesson of, if not the animating impulse behind, the court's invocation
of Article III in Anastasoff-trust in government is easier when there are
structural protections that mediate between independence and accountabil-
ity.44 According to Judge Arnold's account, the founders regarded the doc-
trine of precedent as both "a bulwark of judicial independence in past strug-
gles for liberty, ' '4 5 and as an inherent aspect of judicial power that "sepa-
rate[d] it from a dangerous union with the legislative power."*A
6
Even if one is not persuaded by Judge Arnold's view of the original
understanding, recent scholarship suggests the importance of recognizing a
middle ground between formal constitutional doctrine and institutionally
self-regarding claims of power when considering questions of judicial inde-
pendence and accountability. Thus, long-standing congressional customs
and norms of forbearance in the use of tools available to ensure judicial
accountability may in fact be more important to federal judicial independ-
ence than the comparatively weak protections reposing in constitutional
text.47 We should also consider whether long-standing judicial customs and
42. 538 U.S. 98 (2000).
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the
members of this Court, and none stand in more admiration of the Constitution's
design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their legisla-
tures, and to the political sphere. When contending parties invoke the process of
the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the fed-
eral and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.
Id. at 111 (per curiam). But see Hartnett, supra note 34, at 1717 ("A Court that can simply
refuse to hear a case can no longer credibly say that it had to decide it.").
43. What better example of law "good for one place and time only," Anastasoff, 223
F.3d at 904, could there be? And although not "underground," id., in the way Judge Arnold
intended that word when discussing non-precedential opinions that could not (usually) be
cited under the Eighth Circuit's rule, the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion shared some of
the same defects from the perspective of judicial accountability. "That is the kind of thing
that one individual judge ought to be willing to take responsibility for." Public, supra note 6,
at 6. See also Richman & Reynolds, supra note 16, at 283 ("In per curiam decisions, blame
or praise is spread out among three judges with the pernicious consequence of diffusing the
judges' responsibility and accountability.").
44. Compare Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1095, 1106 (2004) ("Ultimately, there is no choice but to trust the judges.").
45. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900.
46. Id. at 903.
47. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence, in JUDiCIAL
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 160; Burbank VII, supra note 27, at
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norms of forbearance in asserting independence have not similarly been
more important to the quality of independence in fact enjoyed than has the
Article III protection of separation of powers.48 In other words, one does not
have to accept Judge Arnold's views about the meaning of Article III for
this purpose to believe that an important check on judicial independence,
and hence an important aspect of judicial accountability, is accountability to
the past.
49
Tiered appellate decisionmaking also has obvious implications for the
accountability of district courts, although the nature of the effects may de-
pend on the precise nature of the tiering system in force, as also on the state
of technology at the time (which is to say on the system's transparency).
Because resources are spread thin in the courts of appeals, and (if) more and
more responsibility for the lower tiers is given to law clerks and staff attor-
neys, the prospect of effective appellate review becomes ever more both a
memory and a diminishing source of constraint on district courts determined
to go their own way. For, even without considering tiered appellate deci-
sionmaking,
it is hard to maintain that appellate review still provides effective struc-
tural assurance of judicial accountability. Not only have we abandoned a
key check on the equitable discretion of federal trial judges by restricting
interlocutory appeals, but we have broadened their discretion as to facts.
.Perhaps even more important, we have opened vast new vistas for the
exercise of unreviewable discretion, and hence of power, by permitting,
336.
48. See Burbank 1, supra note 8, at 2008-09; Burbank V, supra note 11, at 1679-89;
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 32.
49. "The court must preserve its legitimacy and the ideal of law by invoking a majestic
sense of continuity." Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Pur-
poses, 21 U. DAYTON L. REv. 565, 567 (1996).
Indeed, quite apart from distinctions between judgments and opinions and between
an obligation not entirely to ignore prior decisions and a strict system of precedent, see supra
note 15, both Anastasoff and Hart may be unsatisfactory for the reasons that originalist ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation can be unsatisfactory, particularly with respect to
any question better regarded as one of constitutionalism than as one of formal constitutional
law. Cf Price, supra note 15, at 94 ("when historians locate the beginnings of a strict, tradi-
tional doctrine of precedent only in the nineteenth century, they are not disputing what I term
the core idea of precedent that Anastasoff claims"). It would be interesting in that regard to
try to trace the extent, if any, to which a strong doctrine of precedent developed in part as a
self-restraint when federal courts became more powerful (independent, if you will), garner-
ing widespread acceptance first of judicial review and then of judicial supremacy. See Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998).
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and indeed encouraging, trial judges to become actively involved in set-
tlement.
50
In addition, respect for the sensibilities of their colleagues on the dis-
trict courts, however admirable, may lead courts of appeals to commit to the
lower tiers information about district court judgments or practices of which
they disapprove and of which the bar and the public should be aware. Al-
though Professor Wasby's qualitative empirical work has left him quite
sanguine on the whole, he reports-and is less sanguine about-a number
of instances where the appellate court apparently chose a lower tier in order
to take some of the sting out of rebuke to a district court or prosecutor.5'
Finally on the supposedly limited audience affected by or interested in
error correction, to the extent that the cognitive significance of law is
thought to repose in signals affecting behavior, both district courts and law-
yers may shape their behavior and rulings in light of, or adjust them to, the
misleading messages of the first tier,52 while watchdogs in the academy who
should know better take those messages as the basis for assessing district
court performance, piling one bias (from reliance only on published prece-
dential opinions) upon another (from reliance only on cases that are ap-
pealed).53
50. Burbank I, supra note 8, at 1987 (footnotes omitted). See Richman & Reynolds,
supra note 16, at 295 ("It is not surprising, therefore, that the rate of reversal of district court
judgment has been cut in half since 1960.").
51. See Criteria, supra note 37. In some cases, the technique may be akin to the use of
informal rather than formal means to address non-decisional behavior. See Report of the
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 124 (1993). To the extent that
appellate messages concern district court decisions, however, the accountability calculus
should give great weight to long-standing and robust norms and expectations concerning
openness.
52. "The widespread misperception regarding the disposition of appeals of summary
judgment may be due to the fact that reversals are much more likely to be reported in pub-
lished opinions than affirmances, which frequently are disposed of by unpublished orders...
." Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932
(1987). See also Pether, supra note 19, at 1457 (arguing that in the 1960's "the Fourth Cir-
cuit treated prisoners favorably in its unpublished opinions and unfavorably in its published
opinions"); id. at 1496.
53. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal
Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 591, 603-05
(2004) [hereinafter Burbank VIII]; Merritt & Brudney, supra note 38, at 12 ("Today, a
scholar who studies only published opinions from the United States Courts of Appeals does
so at his or her peril."); Wasby, Process, supra note 37, at 79. Professor Wasby concludes:
With the increase in the proportion of cases receiving non-precedential disposi-
tions, those which are published are disproportionately those in which the court
of appeals disturbs the lower court's or agency's judgment and in which internal
disagreement is manifest in concurring and dissenting opinions. Thus published
opinions in Federal Reporter are an increasingly segregated set of cases with
important policy content, through which the court of appeals performs its law-
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I turn to the proposition that "there is a carving joint between error cor-
rection and lawmaking., 54 This too has implications for judicial independ-
ence and accountability, albeit perhaps more subtle. Imagine a dispute reso-
lution landscape in which Congress provided adequate judicial and other
resources for the federal courts of appeals to decide most of their cases by
signed precedential opinions.55 Consider now why it is that Congress has
not done so, and whether responsibility (or blame, if you will) lies solely in
legislative halls. What has led some very prominent federal judges to op-
pose substantially increasing their number? 56 Is it a concern, if not for their
own prestige, then for the institution's prestige and hence its ability to at-
tract talented new judges? 57 Does it reflect recognition that the addition of
many more judges, at least to some courts of appeals, would lead to the
creation of additional circuits, again diminishing prestige? 58 Should we see
making function while its error-correction work is heavily relegated to unpub-
lished memorandum dispositions. That unpublished rulings contain many judg-
ments disturbing lower court and agency rulings suggests that they are not all
simple, routine, "cookie-cutter" cases.
Criteria, supra note 37 (footnote omitted).
54. Supra text accompanying note 33.
55. Presumably everyone agrees that there are some cases that do not merit more than
the most abbreviated appellate disposition, although there is likely to be disagreement about
what should be included in that category. See Burbank VIII, supra note 53, at 623 ("views of
wheat and chaff can vary over time and.., inevitably will do so in the minds of judges from
different backgrounds and with different preferences-and who are subject to different
caseload pressures-if those judges are undisciplined by higher authority"). In conversation,
Judge Edward Becker has pointed out the difficulty of knowing in advance whether a case
requires mere error correction or will contribute to the development of the law. See also
Jessie Allen, Just Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Court of Appeals, 29
VT. L. REV. 555, 598 (2005).
56. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawback of Growth in the Federal Judici-
ary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147 (1994); Jon. 0. Newman, Are 1,000 Federal Judges Enough? Yes,
More Would Dilute the Quality, N.Y.TIMES, May 17, 1993, at A17; Future, supra note 3, at
543. All of the arguments presented here, as well as some that are not, are discussed and
rebutted in Richman & Reynolds, supra note 16, at 297-316.
57.
They say-you don't hear this said out loud, but in the back rooms ...-we
won't be as important. The more people there are who have a certain office, the
less prestige there is for each person. That's the worst possible reason for oppos-
ing something if what you are proposing is in the public interest....
Some judges say that the people won't be as good. If you have 2,000 judges, the
quality on average will be lower than if you have 1,000. I suppose there is a
theoretical point there, but this is such a big country, and there are so many able
lawyers in the bar. I can't believe we can't fimd 2,000 or 5,000 if it came to that.
And remember that all of this is against the background of the state courts.
Future, supra note 3, at 543-44.
58. Cf Bills Introduced to Split Ninth Circuit, THE THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 2005, at 3
(reporting statement by Rep. Mike Simpson (R-ID) that "house leadership will hold up the
creation of any new judgeships until the Ninth Circuit is split").
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in the opposition concern about the negative impact that more appellate
judges, let alone additional circuits, would have on the uniformity of federal
law?
All are possible explanations for the position of those who would keep
the federal judiciary at or close to its present size. It is also possible, how-
ever, that the position of some federal judges on that issue reflects their
view of the current system of tiered appellate decisionmaking. The hypothe-
sis is that for some that system is not simply to be defended but preferred
(and secretly celebrated). Why? Because it allows them to spend most of
their time on the issues (note that I did not say cases) they deem important
(while staff lawyers and law clerks do most of the work on cases in the
lower tiers). They are thus able to concentrate on making law, and the law
they make, although regional only, is likely to endure in light of both abso-
lute constraints on the capacity of the Supreme Court and that body's cur-
rently depressed appetite for work.59
In his opinion in Hart,6 ° Judge Kozinski asserted that "[w]hile federal
courts of appeals generally lack discretionary review authority, they use
their authority to decide cases by unpublished-and nonprecedential-
dispositions to achieve the same end.",6 1 It is possible that what is operating
here, for some appellate judges, is not the necessity but the desire to mimic
the Supreme Court62 by functionally creating a discretionary docket, focus-
ing on issues rather than cases, and selecting issues according to the judges'
desire to maximize opportunities to exercise creativity or power or both.63
59. Cf Richman & Reynolds, supra note 16, at 277 ("it is more rewarding profession-
ally to deal with a major securities case than with the problem of yet another losing Social
Security claimant"); Fox, supra note 16, at 1225 (suggesting that judges "should not facili-
tate underfunding of the judiciary by delivering second class justice"). What I here call the
Supreme Court's "depressed appetite for work" may result in part from the attitudes of the
justices regarding the nature of precedent and the judicial function in general and the Court's
proper role in particular. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Phi-
losophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82
WASH. U.L.Q. 389, 416-51 (2004).
60. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155.
61. Id. at 1177.
62.
[Tihe Court's unbridled discretion to control its own docket, choosing not only
which cases to decide, but also which "questions presented" to decide, appears
to have contributed to a mindset that thinks of the Supreme Court more as sitting
to resolve controversial questions than to decide cases.
Hartnett, supra note 34, at 1753.
63. See POSNER, supra note 9, at 121. Judge Kozinski has observed:
Most judicial work is routine and dull, involving issues that are of no conse-
quence to anyone other than the parties. Only a few cases raise difficult and in-
teresting issues-the kind of issues that make for an important judicial opinion.
When lawyers seek appointment to judicial office, they generally think of the in-
teresting cases as the core of judicial work; none I know seeks judicial office so
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If so, one need not look for a presidential policy agenda in making fed-
eral judicial nominations, let alone one with a strongly ideological cast, to
understand why traditional differences in the Senate's treatment of nomina-
tions to the courts of appeals and to the Supreme Court have greatly dimin-
ished in recent years.64 Moreover, as I have previously observed in discuss-
ing summary judgment, the lawmaking disease-this appetite for making
law on issues rather than deciding cases-may be spreading to the district
courts.6 5
"Writing an opinion," Judge Kozinski observed in Hart, "is not simply
a matter of laying out the facts and announcing a rule of decision. Preceden-
tial opinions are meant to govern not merely the cases for which they are
written, but future cases as well., 66 He continued:
In writing an opinion, the court must be careful to recite all the facts that
are relevant to its ruling, while omitting facts that it considers irrelevant.
... The rule of decision cannot simply be announced, it must be selected
after due consideration of the relevant legal and policy considerations.
Where more than one rule could be followed-which is often the case-
the court must explain why it is selecting one and rejecting the others.
Moreover, the rule must be phrased with precision and with due regard
to how it will be applied in future cases. A judge drafting a precedential
opinion must not only consider the facts of the immediate case, but must
also envision the countless permutations of facts that might arise in the
universe of future cases . . . Writing a precedential opinion, thus, in-
volves much more than deciding who wins and who loses in a particular
case. It is a solemn judicial act that sets the course of the law for hun-
dreds or thousands of litigants and potential litigants .... 67
he can spend his days, nights, weekends and holidays slogging through an un-
ending stack of routine, fact-intensive and largely (in the grand scheme of
things) inconsequential cases. Human nature being what it is, there is a strong
tendency to devote a disproportionate amount of judicial time to the big cases
and to give short shrift to the small ones. There's actually a lot to be said for this.
Kozinski, supra note 44, at 1097. A reader of this passage may be forgiven for thinking that
the judge's additional observation--"Yet, the small cases, too have a legitimate claim to a
fair share of judicial time and attention"-either lacks conviction or presupposes a "fair
share" that is very small. Id. at 1098.
64. See Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege and Power: The Senate's Role in the
Appointment of Judges to the Federal District Courts and Courts of Appeals, 86 JUDICATURE
24 (2002) [hereinafter Burbank IX.
65. See Burbank VIII, supra note 53, at 625; Cf Jonathan Lear, Whatever, NEW
REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 2005, at 25 (reviewing HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2004))
("This is the problem with bullshit: it is contagious. It invites us all to grow more detached
from the real, to give up caring about what is true and what is false.").
66. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1176.
67. Id. at 1176-77. Cf Panel Discussion, Citation of Unpublished Opinions: The Appel-
late Judges Speak, _ FORDHAM L. REv, __, _ (forthcoming 2005) (Judge Pierre Leval)
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It is worth repeating the last sentence of this quotation. "It is a solemn
judicial act that sets the course of the law for hundreds or thousands of liti-
gants and potential litigants." Substitute "legislative" for "judicial," and, as
Judge Friendly might have observed, the good becomes the bad.68 In any
event, Richard Arnold had no such view of his role as a federal judge. Cen-
tral to the disagreement between Judge Arnold and Judge Kozinski about
tiered appellate decisionmaking is a difference of view about what courts do
or should do.69
Richard Arnold believed that courts exist not to make law simpliciter
but to do so only as a byproduct of resolving disputes. In other words, for
him lawmaking was not the summum bonum of the exercise of judicial
power. Lawmaking was instead a necessary consequence of the exercise of
the power, and the performance of the duty, to resolve concrete disputes
brought to the courts by litigants. 70 Even as to that, although Arnold was
clear that a federal judge must not shirk the duty to decide knowing that the
decision will be unpopular, he was equally clear that federal judges must
observe jurisdictional limitations (that unquestionably are) imposed on the
exercise of judicial power by the Constitution and statutes.7'
Judge Arnold was, in sum, the antithesis of the eager lawmaker, and
hence the antithesis of his main judicial opponent in the debate about tiered
appellate decisionmaking. 72 He was the reluctant lawmaker. Ancestor wor-
ship may not be required by Article III, but we should not allow our judg-
ment about formal constitutional requirements to obscure the implications
("it goes through thirty or forty drafts") [hereinafter Panel Discussion].
68. "Whoever first characterized the continental European system as 'inquisitorial' did a
profound disservice to constructive legal thought. Substitute 'inquiring' and the bad becomes
the good." Hearings Before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System, second phase, vol. I, at 205 (1974) (statement of Judge Friendly).
69. For a useful discussion of the characteristics of, and differences between, the "dis-
pute resolution" (or "private rights") model and the "public rights" model of the judicial
function, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. et al, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 67-73 (5th ed. 2003).
70. "My position is that the function of the courts is to announce the law only as an
incident to the resolution of disputes." Future, supra note 3, at 59. "Courts (or at least federal
courts) do not sit to pronounce the law, but rather to decide cases and controversies." Hart-
nett, supra note 15, at 126 (footnote omitted).
71. See, e.g., Future, supra note 3, at 59. Cf Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 65
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("A timid judge, like a biased judge, is intrinsically a
lawless judge.").
72. In fairness, it should be noted that Judge Kozinski's views about opinions, prece-
dential and non-precedential, and about the judicial role are by no means universally held.
For a radically different picture of both, see Panel Discussion, supra note 67, at _ (Judge
Edward Becker).
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of its converse-what Jerome Frank called "posterity-worship"73-- for judi-
cial independence and accountability.
A (self-styled) realist might say about the federal courts of appeals
that, given the size of their dockets and resource constraints and given
moreover the Supreme Court's starvation diet (whether or not due to the
justices' own "posterity-worship"), law declaration is appropriately the first
priority of those courts. The empirical component of such a view to the
side,74 even if, unlike certiorari, tiered appellate decisionmaking is not in
tension with "the classic justification for judicial review,, 75 the notion that
"the power to interpret is primary and the case deciding power is secondary
... misinterpret[s] the Constitution and ... confuse[s] cause and effect., 76
Moreover, some of the law being declared seems increasingly divorced
from flesh and blood disputes (the existence of which is a requirement of
Article III), 7 7 a concern that has been forcefully advanced in opposition to
the increasing reliance on summary judgment in federal civil cases. 78
In defending tiered appellate decisionmaking, Judge Boyce Martin
emphasized the quest for a "cohesive and understandable" 79 body of law.
Yet, what he fears as "muddying the water" 80 could be an important devel-
73. See supra text accompanying note 2.
74. Although the question of citation and the question of precedential status are sepa-
rate, it would be interesting to explore the association, if any, between the views of a court of
appeals on Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 and its reputation as either an eager or a reluctant
lawmaker. Such an inquiry should include attention to docket pressures, the hypothesis being
that it is not just-indeed it may not be primarily--courts of appeals which are swamped
with cases that appreciate the opportunities presented by tiered appellate decisionmaking to
fashion a functionally discretionary docket. This is suggested by data indicating that the
greatest number of comments opposing Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 came from appellate
judges in circuits (the Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Federal) that have workloads below the
national average, as measured (except in the Federal Circuit) by terminations on the merits
per active judge. By contract appellate judges in the three busiest circuits (the Fourth, Fifth,
and Eleventh) submitted a total of two comments in opposition. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Much
Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm und Drang Over the Citation of Unpublished Opin-
ions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. _, _ (forthcoming 2005). Professor Schiltz concludes that
"something other than concern about workloads must be animating judges." Id.
75. Hartnett, supra note 34, at 1713-14 (footnote omitted).
76. John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting
the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 373 (1988). See Hartnett, supra note 34, at 1716.
77. Cf Cappalli, supra note 22, at 765 (suggesting that those practicing tiered appellate
decisionmaking "consider the precedential force field to be much wider than permitted by
proper legal methodology; that is, they treat words, phrases, ideas, principles, tests, stan-
dards, and ratios as binding rather than persuasive").
78. See Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1941-45
(1998); Burbank VIII, supra note 53, at 625; see also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:
An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMP. LEG.
STuD. 459, 525-31 (2004) (more general consequences of vanishing trials).
79. Martin, supra note 17, at 192.
80. Id.
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opmental process, the urge to abort which may lead to rules that emerge
prematurely and that are hard to change. 81 Indeed, judges who are eager to
maximize opportunities to exercise creativity or power (or both) tend to
neglect the risks and costs of prematurity at every level of the court sys-
tem.
82
When issues replace cases as the object of judicial attention, and when
judges assume the burden to consider "not only. . . the facts of the immedi-
ate case, but also envision the countless permutations of facts that might
arise in the universe of future cases, ' ' 83 we have moved from the inductive to
the deductive realm, from techniques traditionally associated with common
law to those traditionally associated with civil law,84 from the domain of
courts to that of legislatures.
85
81. See Allen, supra note 55, at 601 ("fully formed at birth"). This, of course, is quite
the opposite of the concern that it may take a court of appeals too long to produce a prece-
dential opinion settling a question, with all of the costs that attend conflicting opinions in the
lower tiers. See United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2000)
("twenty separate unpublished dispositions instructing district courts to take a total of three
different approaches to correct the problem").
For a valuable contribution to the literature on tiered appellate decisionmaking that
takes account of both the difficulties caused by appellate court structure (i.e., panel decisions
that must be followed) and of the need for judicial dialogue, see Douglas A. Berman & Jef-
frey 0. Cooper, In Defense of Less Precedential Opinions: A Reply to Chief Judge Martin,
60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2025 (1999). See also Barnett, supra note 15, at 21-25 (discussing different
degrees of precedential force, some of which would obviate problems caused by rule that a
panel decision can only be overruled by the court en banc); Panel Discussion, supra note 67,
at - (Judge Michael Boudin) ("it is a real problem to go around to all the other judges to get
it undone. .
82. See Burbank I, supra note 8, at 1998 ("just as premature aggregation in a class ac-
tion may seriously prejudice the ability of those who have been injured to establish a right to
recover under the governing substantive law, so may other forms of aggregation, such as
consolidation") (footnote omitted); id at 1996-97 ("The calculus is different for trial judges,
particularly in the age of managerial judging, aggregation, and settlement.") (footnote omit-
ted).
83. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1176, quoted supra text accompanying note 67.
84.
[W]hether a disposition should be published depends in part on what one views
as precedent or as contributing to precedent and stating the law. If this is limited
to abstract and theoretical statements of legal rules, less will be published.
However, if precedent is seen as developing incrementally through stating the
application of a rule to facts which mark out a line, then more is to be published.
Process, supra note 37, at 101 (emphasis added). See Pether, supra note 19, at 1512; Allen,
supra note 55, at 600. Of course, the traditional view has been that "[p]recedent is one of the
primary ways in which common-law systems are distinct from civil-law systems." Price,
supra note 15, at 120 (footnote omitted). For a revised view of civilian practices, using pub-
lication and precedent in France for comparison, see Cappalli, supra note 22, at 770.
85. See Cappalli, supra note 22, at 774-75; Allen, supra note 55, at 599. "While courts
are called upon in particular disputes to 'settle authoritatively what is to be done,' it is for
other institutions to do so when what is at issue are laws of general prospective application."
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The other side of this coin is that, preoccupied by issues and by the ag-
ony of foresight when determining today what facts are and will be impor-
tant to the wise framing of those issues for the future, our courts-victims
of a "perniciously tyrannical future" 86 -may give inadequate attention to
the wise and just resolution of the cases before them.87 Another worry is that
the emphasis of tiered appellate decisionmaking on writing opinions declar-
ing the law slights the interests of all litigants in knowing why their case
was decided as it was, 88 as well as the interests of all who seek to monitor
the performance of courts to ensure that their decisions are rational (not
arbitrary), treat those who are similarly situated alike, and are consistent
with authority to which they are subordinate.
An irony emerging from this perspective on tiered appellate decision-
making is that, if Congress were interested in using its control over the
budget to rein in "activist judges," the best means to do so might be pre-
cisely the opposite of those which seem obvious. Once most of the promises
made to Congress on its behalf in 1925 were forgotten,89 the Supreme Court
Hartnett, supra note 15, at 149.
86. Supra text accompanying note 2.
87. Cf Wasby, supra note 15, at 333 (noting "instances when the panel may resolve a
case in two dispositions-a published opinion covering matters of greater importance or of
first impression in the circuit, and a memodispo treating the remainder of the issues"). On the
risks of elevating opinions over judgments in the Supreme Court, see Hartnett, supra note 15,
at 136-46. Cf id at 134 n. 58 ("Issue-by-issue voting then, is consonant with ... emphasis
on courts as the managers of the law; it is in considerable tension with the traditional empha-
sis, rooted in Article III, on courts as case deciders."). Having noted that "all writs of certio-
rari are limited writs" in the sense that "[n]one brings forth all properly preserved claims of
error within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction," Hartnett, supra note 34, at 1707, Professor
Hartnett continues:
Put somewhat differently, the Supreme Court does not so much grant certiorari
to particular cases, but rather to particular questions. Especially in light of its ex-
pressed lack of interest in simple error correction, the result can well be the af-
firmance of judgments that, while correct as to the controversial issue on which
certiorari is granted, are nevertheless erroneous because based on a simpler error
that the Supreme Court declines to consider.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
88.
The third duty of the court is to write an opinion which is intelligible, which ex-
plains the result, and which we hope, is acceptable to the losing side. I think
about losing litigants a lot. Those are the people who need to understand that
they have been heard-that a reasoning creature of some kind has evaluated their
argument and come to some sort of defensible conclusions about it. They won't
like it; they won't enjoy losing, but I hope that they will have a sense that they
have been heard. And so it's important how opinions are written.
Future, supra note 3, at 536.
89. See Hartnett, supra note 34, at 1647, 1684-92, 1704-12. See also id. at 1724 n.460
("With the exception of the rule of four, the Supreme Court no longer follows the approaches
to certiorari described in the hearings on the Judges' Bill."). Note, however, that more lim-
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became essentially impervious to caseload pressures. And so, we now
know, are the courts of appeals, at least so long as they have an adequate
supply of judicial surrogates with whose help they can create functionally
discretionary dockets through tiered decisonmaking, leaving Article III
judges freer to search for lawmaking opportunities.9" In both cases, the abil-
ity of the courts to set their own agenda permits them "to 'shed the long-
standing image of a neutral arbiter and an interpreter of policy' and emerge
'as an active participant in making policy."' 91 Thus, rather than seeking to
beat the federal courts of appeals into submission by drowning them in
work,92 our hypothetical Congress should give them the resources required
to treat-and require that they treat93-if not all, then most, cases with the
dignity of a signed precedential opinion.94
This would solve the problem of incentives that might follow if tiered
appellate decisionmaking were not addressed in gross, and adequate re-
sources were not provided, leaving courts free to switch from nonpreceden-
tial opinions to judgment orders.95 I accept that there is more than one way
to skin a cat. I also believe, however, that if judges accepted the importance
ited forms of certiorari existed prior to 1925. See id. at 1651.
90. On the courts of appeals as "the new certiorari courts," see Richman & Reynolds,
supra note 16, at 93-94. See also Stephen L. Wasby & Martha Humphries Ginn, Triage in
Appellate Courts: Cross-Level Comparison, 88 JUDICATURE 216 (2005). Cf Hartnett, supra
note 34, at 1647 n. 16 ("Under current certiorari practice, most petitions are never read by the
Justices, who instead rely largely on one or two page summaries prepared by a law clerk").
Of course, even though additional staff may free up more of a judge's time in one sense,
responsible supervision takes time. Consider Judge Arnold's vivid simile:
Judges are like funnels: There's a big opening at the top and all the law clerks
and the staff attorneys pour stuff in there. There's just a little funnel at the bot-
tom. It all has to go through one person. And unless the judge widens out that
bottom so that it all just drops through rubber-stamped, you're not really getting
any more done.
Future, supra note 3, at 543.
91. Hartnett, supra note 34, at 1718 (quoting RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S AGENDA: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION 15 (1991)). See also Wasby & Ginn, supra note 90, at 224.
92. See Conference Adopts Cost-Containment Plan in Wake of Limited Congressional
Funding: Continues Push for Court Funds, THE THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 2004, at 1.
93. The provision of adequate resources should solve any separation of powers problem
that might otherwise be created by such a requirement. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327,
350 (2000); Burbank V, supra note 11, at 1688. But cf Panel Discussion, supra note 67, at
_ (Judge Michael Boudin) (suggesting that it "would raise a constitutional problem that
would be of great interest if the Congress or the Rules Committee ever sought to prescribe
weight...")
94. For the possibility that the behavior of Supreme Court justices in the certiorari proc-
ess is affected by their views about the judicial role and precedent (so that, for example,
those favoring the creation of broad rules will vote to take fewer cases), see Cordray &
Cordray, supra note 59, at 423-34.
95. See supra note 22.
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of judicial accountability in this area and the negative implications of (some
of) their current practices for the ability to hold them accountable, they
would not ask the watchmen to turn the other cheek.96
Judge Arnold himself observed that the remedy for caseload pressures
was not "to create an underground body of law good for one place and time
only," but rather "to create enough judgeships to handle the volume, or, if
that is not practical, to take enough time to do a competent job with each
case." 97 He acknowledged and would have been willing to pay the cost of
growing backlogs.98 He did not mention (although it may have occurred to
him) that, although making appellate courts more accountable in this way
would not in one sense reduce their ability to make law, it could reorient
them to the incremental, case-oriented lawmaking role that he championed,
a role that is difficult to discern in Hart v. Massinari.99 On this hypothesis,
the answer is to feed, not to starve, the beast! 100
III. "A LITTLE TOUCH OF POLITICS"
In connection with the first dimension of judicial accountability that
this account reveals-accountability to the past-it is not clear whether
Judge Arnold's view of the role of courts in making law was intended-in
96.
When I became Chief Justice of the Third Circuit in 1998, I persuaded my col-
leagues that we owe a greater duty to our colleagues of the bar and to their cli-
ents-you represent the appellants, you do not get oral argument, you get a one-
line disposition, boom! "affirmed," you are out. I viewed it as a matter of respect
for the bar, respect for the profession. I mean judges are nothing but lawyers
with robes on, a robe and a commission, and lawyers are part of our profession. I
think we owe respect to our profession. I also viewed it not just as a matter of re-
spect for our profession, but as a matter of responsibility and accountability. My
colleagues agreed, and we ceased writing judgment orders and started writings
NPOs in every case.
Panel Discussion, supra note 67, at _ (Judge Edward Becker).
97. Anastasoff, 223 F.2d at 904. See Future, supra note 3, at 543 ("My feeling is that we
need more judges").
98. See Anastasoff, 223 F.2d at 904. See also Future, supra note 3, at 538.
99. Consider Judge Kozinski's assertion that unler Anastasoff "federal judges are not
merely required to follow the law, they are also required to make law in every case." Hart,
266 F.3d at 1160 (emphasis in original). There is irony in this emphasis on making law from
someone who understands the dubiety of historical arguments predicated on the centrality of
opinions. See id. at 1168-69. For, as John Harrison has pointed out, the absence of official
reporters in the early years of the Supreme Court is hard to square with the argument that our
federal judiciary was "set up with a focus on judicial exposition of law." John Harrison, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and the Text ofArticle III,
64 U. CHI. L. REv. 203, 230 (1997). See Hartnett, supra note 15, at 129.
100. From that perspective, the benefits thus achieved should be considered in answering
the question whether "spending more money, more judge time, on cases is ... worth it."
Panel Discussion, supra note 67, at _ (Judge Michael Boudin).
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either positive or normative dimensions-to include the Supreme Court.
The Court enjoys a discretionary docket because Congress agreed in 1925,
and has agreed since then, with the need to relieve it of the burdens of man-
datory appellate review. 10 1 Freedom from those burdens, in turn, facilitated
a different view of the Court's role in interpreting the Constitution-in mak-
ing constitutional law.
The power to refuse to hear cases enables the Court to bide its time and
"to escape, at least temporarily, from the logical implications of an ini-
tial unpopular on-the-merits decision." It also enables the Court to inter-
vene selectively, without committing itself to policing a new area it
brings under its supervision. As a result, then, the procedural license
given by certiorari has had a profound role in shaping our substantive
constitutional law.'
02
Having for eighty years exercised the power to pick and choose among
cases vying for review, having from the beginning identified conflicting
rulings below as a criterion important to the exercise of its discretion, 0 3 and
for that and other reasons having come to focus on issues (questions) rather
than cases, 1°4 the Court does not, and perhaps could not, project Judge Ar-
nold's image of a reluctant lawmaker.
Tiered appellate decisionmaking in some circuits has effects quite
similar to those we associate with the Supreme Court's approach to its dis-
cretionary docket. I have previously observed that "technical proficiency
requires hard work, patience, and thoroughness-in a common law system
the handmaidens of the inductive method,"'105 and that one of the less-
noticed costs of tiered appellate decisionmaking "may be further erosion in
the capacity for technical proficiency of our judges."' 0 6 Another cost I noted
on that occasion is the "further erosion of attributes that distinguish the ju-
dicial process from other processes of authority, including the political
processes.'0 7 Whether or not intentional, the creation of a functionally dis-
101. See Hartnett, supra note 34, at 1660-1704 (Taft's successful campaign for broad
discretionary power to determine which cases to hear); id at 1708-10 (subsequent history of
mandatory jurisdiction culminating in 1988 legislation virtually eliminating it).
102. Id. at 1730-31 (footnotes omitted). See id. at 1732 ("would the Supreme Court have
incorporated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments if it were obliged to review
every state judgment that upheld a criminal conviction or sentence over a defendant's objec-
tion based on one of those Amendments?").
103. See id. at 1721; supra note 89.
104. See id. at 1705-07; supra note 87.
105. Stephen B. Burbank, Making Progress the Old-Fashioned Way, 149 U. PA. L. REv.
1231, 1233 (2001) [hereinafter Burbank X].
106. Id. at 1234.
107. Id.
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cretionary docket may suit the utility function of some court of appeals
judges. By thus encouraging posterity-worship, tiered appellate decision-
making can blur the notional line that separates courts from legislatures.
As to the second dimension-accountability to the present and the fu-
ture-tiered appellate decisionmaking in some circuits may leave parties
unconvinced that their arguments have been heard and may make it difficult
for others who are interested in what courts do to monitor decisions in the
interest of exposing and hence deterring arbitrariness and the inequitable
administration of the laws. Judge Arnold's expressed conviction that his
colleagues would not purposely manipulate the practice so as to enable and
conceal lawlessness was doubtless sincerely held. It is not obviously, how-
ever, in these times a conviction that those who are not judges should be
asked to share on faith. 
108
Although Judge Arnold's extrajudicial writings were instinct with con-
cem about judicial accountability, he did not often write about judicial in-
dependence. That is not, I suggest, because he thought that everyone under-
stands what judicial independence is and accepts that, defined as a judge
might like to define it, it is an unalloyed good. He did state on one occasion
that federal judges "are not accountable in any way for the results of the
cases that [they] decide."' 1 9 Yet, he knew that, if the federal judiciary is in
fact, or is perceived to be, insufficiently accountable, it will lose the inde-
pendence necessary for it to accomplish, if not what the architects of our
system intended, then what developing American constitutionalism requires.
In linking the institution of precedent to Article III in Anastasoff, after all,
the judge stressed that it was both a barrier to "a dangerous union with leg-
islative power"'" 0 and "a bulwark of judicial independence in past struggles
for liberty."'' .
The judge believed that the federal judiciary must have the "continuing
consent of the governed"'" 2 in order to do its job. He also believed that,
Those branches of government do things simply because they believe they are
best in the public interest. That is their nature. Courts, on the other hand, are not,
or should not be, simple expressions of human will. We're supposed to make our
decisions by reference to something other than our own personal opinions, by
reference to the law, reason, the facts, concepts like that.
Future, supra note 3, at 544-45.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43. See also Panel Discussion, supra note
67, at _ (Judge Michael Boudin) (discussing the problem of "perception becoming reality").
109. Answers for Interview for "The Third Branch" 3 (January 29, 1990) [hereinafter
Answers] (available from author). Neither this answer, nor the question to which it re-
sponded, was included in the published interview. See Judge Richard Arnold: Presenting the
Courts'Budget to Congress, THE THiRD BRANCH 9-10 (Feb. 1990).
110. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903.
111. Id. at 900.
112. Public, supra note 6, at 5.
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once a court has observed all jurisdictional limitations on its power, it must
render and accept responsibility for a decision, however unpopular, that the
law requires. From this perspective, his repeated expressions of concern
about judicial accountability represented underlying anxiety about the pros-
pects of judicial independence, the continuing willingness or ability of the
federal courts not to "pull [their] punches" 113 when the law requires an un-
popular decision.
To the extent that Judge Arnold would have exempted the Supreme
Court from the modest and restrained lawmaking role that he advocated,
perhaps he would have acknowledged the need also to accord it some relief
from this position that, all jurisdictional restraints having been observed, a
court must not shirk from deciding a case in accordance with the law as that
court understands it. Surely, at least, he would have recognized that, the
more indeterminate law is, and the more room there is therefore for the play
of policy and preference, the more legitimate-and the more important-it
is for a court of last resort also to take account of considerations that bear on
the perceived legitimacy and continued effectiveness of the judiciary as a
whole."14 Indeed, since it is easier for the Supreme Court to duck cases by
denying certiorari than it is for appellate courts by using the lower tiers, and
having regard to limited appellate capacity and appetites, perhaps he would
have deemed it appropriate for all courts to take account of such considera-
tions in making choices when their decisions are likely to be the last judicial
word on the subject, in fact if not in theory." 15
113. Id. at 59. In seeking explanations for President Washington's nomination of William
Drayton, who had served as a British judge, to the newly created United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, Judge Arnold noted that he had "faithfully applied the law
even when it favored enemies of the crown. He was the sort of man, one supposes, who
could be depended upon to make unpopular rulings, even rulings placing his own position in
jeopardy, when the law required." Judicial Politics, supra note 12, at 485.
114.
Only when the concepts of sociological and legal legitimacy are distinguished
does Casey's provocative aspect come into focus: the majority opinion suggests
that the Supreme Court is permitted and perhaps required by law to base its deci-
sions partly on public perceptions and, in particular, on an asserted interest in
preserving its own sociological legitimacy.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1789, 1841. See
id. at 1850 ("in my view it is morally as well as legally legitimate for courts to take public
reaction into account in determining whether to extend judicial precedent to recognize new
rights") (footnote omitted); infra text accompanying notes 122-24.
115. For the potential of opinions that can be cited but that lack "full precedential
weight" to foster dialogue about, and prevent premature ossification with respect to, novel or
underdeveloped issues, see Berman & Cooper, supra note 81, at 2037-41. This is quite dif-
ferent from strategic behavior on the part of a court of appeals (or judge) in seeking to affect
the course of decision in the Supreme Court, of which I doubt that Judge Arnold would have
approved. But see Alex Kozinski, The Many Faces of Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 861, 869 (1998).
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Judge Arnold was candid about, and humorous in describing, the poli-
tics of his appointment to the federal bench. 16 He was also, and characteris-
tically, modest in attributing his appointment and lengthy tenure as Chair of
the Budget Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States to his
pre-judicial service as legislative assistant to Senator Dale Bumpers, a
member of the Appropriations Subcommittee for the judiciary.' 17 I do not
doubt that this played a part in the Chief Justice's initial decision to appoint
Judge Arnold, just as I do not doubt that Arnold's extraordinary personal
charm, his integrity and his political acumen would have kept him in that
position in any event.
Judge Arnold enjoyed his service as Chair of the Budget Committee,
he said, because, "[i]t has a little touch of politics about it ... and I have
always enjoyed politics." 118 He also observed that "[p]olitics is people, and.
. it should be and can be an honorable profession."'1 19 On another occasion,
however, noting that "many members of the public seem to feel that judges
are just politicians in another guise," Judge Arnold concluded that
"[s]ometimes some of us are, but we should not be.' 120
These views are not inconsistent, insofar as, while acting as Chair of
the Budget Committee, Judge Arnold, although a judge, was not acting as
part of a court exercising judicial power. Moreover, he could and likely
would have distinguished between a federal judge and an elected politician
with words similar to those he used to describe why the federal judiciary is
not usually uppermost in the minds of members of Congress--"we lack a
particular constituency.' ' 121 In any event, that Judge Arnold disapproved of
deeming federal judges "just politicians" hardly suggests that he intended
the bright line between law and politics that the distinction might suggest.
I believe that Judge Arnold would have distinguished between (1) a
situation in which, responding to popular sentiment at the time, a court
evaded a result that either clear (and clearly controlling) precedent or the
unmistakable tenor of positive law required, 122 and (2) a situation in which,
precedent or positive law not unmistakably dictating the result, the court
considered the implications of alternative decisions for the continuing abil-
ity of the judiciary to decide cases as required by the law as generally un-
116. See Discontent, supra note 3, at 767-68.
117. His humor again shone through. "I was appointed on merit, the same way I became
a Federal judge." Money, supra note 6, at 22, quoted supra note 6.
118. Obituary, supra note 1.
119. Id.
120. Future, supra note 3, at 545.
121. Money, supra note 6, at 25.
122. See Public, supra note 6, at 59. Cf Madison, supra note 7, at 289 (distinguishing
between transient public opinion and "opinion manifested and solidified over decades of
time" in discussing Madison's view of constitutional interpretation).
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derstood when it is not popular to do so. In the former, the court would be
engaged in a political act difficult to distinguish from the behavior of an
elected politician responding to a constituency (and not the constituency
whose rights Madison was most concerned about). 23 In the latter, the be-
havior would be "political" only in the sense that statesmanship, deference,
and compromise in a world of disputable premises and conclusions are part
of the art of governance. 1
24
Judge Arnold's illuminating discussion of the writings of James Madi-
son suggests that for both men constitutional text was the beginning rather
than the end of interpretation and that regard should be paid to customs,
norms, and practice in deciding constitutional meaning.'2 5 This is not sur-
prising because both Madison and Arnold, while brilliant thinkers comfort-
able with theory, were practical people who understood that constitutional
arrangements must accommodate the developing needs of our society, as
they must the conflicting pressures on actors entrusted with the important
business of governance in a democracy. 26 Since they were practical people,
123. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANING: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 290 (1996).
124.
But deference is not a one way street. Not only does the judiciary properly defer
to the other branches in the vast majority of cases, but a central question (per-
haps the central question) in constitutional adjudication is the scope of this def-
erence, and whether it should vary depending on the constitutional provision at
issue or the political power of the persons harmed.
Hartnett, supra note 15, at 156-57 (footnotes omitted). See id. at 157-58 ("Indeed, the very
practice of writing opinions is an act of judicial deference and an invitation to dialogue.").
See also Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the Constitu-
tional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21 (1998).
125. See Madison, supra note 7, at 285-93. Elsewhere, Judge Arnold expressed his own
view that
[t]o understand the relationship among the branches of the federal government,
one must realize that much of constitutional law is not made or interpreted by
judges, but simply grows up. It is a matter of practice and is found not only in
documents, but in what people do firom day to day in their governmental fumc-
tions. Constitutional law is made by the President, Congress and the courts.
Money, supra note 6, at 19.
126.
I can't claim that Madison changed often enough to be perfect, but it does seem
to me that he exhibited a healthy sense of practicality in approaching the great
constitutional questions that confronted him. Practicality, after all, is not a bad
thing in government. If the government doesn't work, if the Constitution is in-
terpreted in such a way as to make it so rigid as to be completely unable to
adapt, government will fail of its essential purpose.
Madison, supra note 7, at 293. See id at 273, 288. See also Richard S. Arnold, Mr. Justice
Brennan-An Appreciation, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 7, 14 (1991) ("For judges to make
up new principles is illegitimate. For them to adapt old principles to changing conditions is
necessary.").
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"it is ... impossible to believe that they were concerned with the structure
[of government] to the exclusion of the processes of dialogue and interac-
tion it enabled."'' 27 Those processes are part of our politics.
In considering a robust notion of judicial independence, requiring free-
dom from virtually all influence by other actors, that some political scien-
tists deploy to support the proposition that judicial independence is a myth, I
have maintained that the notion is both too robust and inconsistent with our
constitutional architecture.
It is too late to deny that, in addition to being an integral part of a politi-
cal system, the federal courts are involved in politics, at least if politics
are "defined as the honorable profession of ensuring that government
performs for the benefit of the people." The admission does not, how-
ever, negate either the reality or ideal of core judicial independence. In-
fluence is not control. It is consistent with our constitutional design and
may be required by evolving notions of law and lawmaking. 128
Judge Arnold understood that courts are involved in politics in this
sense, and, far from regretting that fact, he rejoiced in it. As he said, "poli-
tics is people. 1 29 His concern for the people who came before his court,
including the lowliest and most desperate characters, 30 stands as both an
enduring monument to his memory and an enduring caution to those who
are inclined to make categorical judgments in apportioning judicial effort.' 31
For as the judge observed, "[a]lthough you pick up a file and say, 'Well,
there is a ninety-eight percent chance that this is frivolous,' that does not
mean you read only two percent of the file.' 132
Thus, it is not surprising that Judge Arnold believed that "running for
office [was] one of the biggest parts of [his] education,"'133 and that he found
it "very helpful as [he sat] on the bench to have had some experience in
politics.' ' 134 He once observed that
127. Burbank l, supra note 9, at 327.
128. Id. at 327-28 (footnote omitted).
129. Supra text accompanying note 119.
130. See Future, supra note 3, at 536 (quoted supra note 88); id. at 541 (expressing
doubts about specialized administrative court for social security cases "because I think that
ordinary folks, when the most important decision in their lives is whether they can get these
benefits, a question that turns on federal law, should have a federal court to go to"); id. at 545
("The second point is that we must be open. People, even if they are demented, even if they
are inmates, need to have a place to go to complain and be heard.").
131. "I do not have data on this, but, from my experience, prime candidates for unpub-
lished opinions are Social Security, Black Lung, and criminal cases as well as prisoner peti-
tions. Some cases in those areas do merit publication, but many do not." Martin, supra note
17, at 183.
132. Money, supra note 6, at 34.
133. SYMPOSIUM ON THE JUDICIARY 12 (Patricia A. Eables & John P. Gill eds., 1989).
134. Id.
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the courts, like the rest of the government, depend on the consent of the
governed. And we judges are, in a sense, political. I have sometimes de-
scribed myself as a professional politician, because I think that the
courts are, in the finest and broadest sense of the word, a political insti-
tution. We function not on paper or in the abstract, but as part of a real,
living system of government, each part of which has its own role to
play.' 3
5
The parallels between Judge Arnold and Judge Edward Becker, an-
other great federal judge whose work and career it has been my privilege to
study, are arresting. Both came to the bench with extensive experience in
politics. Both were (and Judge Becker still is) adept at common law judg-
ing, bringing "high intelligence, extraordinary energy, and unbounded intel-
lectual curiosity ' 136 to their work. In both we see as well the added qualities
of "fascination and patience with the complexities of legal doctrine and
willingness, at the end of the day, to abide the mistakes and limitations of
authorities [they are] pledged to respect."' 137 In sum, for Richard Arnold, as
for Edward Becker, the notion that "law is nothing more than politics" was
"not a counsel of despair because, for him, law [was] equally nothing less
than politics: the art of seeking to improve the human condition through
intelligence, patience, persuasion, and compromise."'
138
Four years ago, I noted how much more difficult the road was for fed-
eral judges dedicated to technical proficiency and the common law method
than it was thirty or even twenty years before, 139 and I suggested that, in any
event, "technical proficiency is a fortuity among judges selected, by what-
ever appointive or elective system, for their ideology or their willingness to
trim their judicial sails to the prevailing winds of interest group politics.' 140
Moreover, having argued that "politics need not be the enemy either of judi-
cial independence or of judicial distinction,"'14 1 I asked, "What room is there
in tomorrow's politics for patience, for persuasion, or for compromise?'
142
The intervening years have done nothing to quell my anxiety about the
state of the federal judiciary or about the state of the politics of which fed-
eral courts are inescapably a part. They thus have served to reinforce the
sense of urgency I feel when contemplating Richard Arnold's distinguished
career and the passing from the scene of his luminous example.
135. Id.
136. BurbankX, supra note 105, at 1232.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1234-35.
139. See id. at 1233.
140. Id. at 1234.
141. Id.
142. BurbankX, supra note 105, at 1235.
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Consider first the politics of federal judicial selection. Even one who
understands that hypocrisy is the coin of the realm within the beltway may
have difficulty swallowing current levels on both sides of the aisle. Yet, all
of this hypocrisy, partisan battling, and threats of political nuclear war143
may keep us from focusing on what may be at stake. We are at risk of the
appointment to the federal bench of individuals who lack both Richard Ar-
nold's capacity for judicial independence and his capacity for constructive
political engagement.
I draw a distinction between ideology in the weak sense of the prefer-
ences as to political, social, and economic arrangements that all sentient
adults, and hence all judges, have and that inevitably affect decisions in
which there is an element of discretion, on the one hand, and ideology in the
strong sense of preferences that "hold sway with such power as to be imper-
vious to adjudicative facts, competing policies, or the governing law as it is
generally understood,"' 44 on the other. Ideology in this second sense, I have
argued, "is revealed as the enemy of judicial independence.' 45 It is in that
regard no different from non-ideological pre-commitment to certain legal
positions for the purpose of securing or retaining a judicial position.
To understand why that is true, it is essential to recall that (1) judicial
independence is not an end in itself but a means to governmental ends, (2)
within the federal government, those ends relate to the institution of the
federal judiciary rather -than to individual judges, (3) the primary ends
sought by the architects of federal judicial independence were the enable-
ment of judicial review and the resolution of ordinary cases according to
law, 146 and (4) "judicial independence and judicial accountability [being]
joined at the hip. . . judicial independence is no better served by the percep-
tion of unaccountability than it is by unfounded cynicism bred of irrespon-
sible criticism."' 147 Accordingly, "[t]rue judicial independence . . . requires
insulation from those forces, external and internal, that so constrain human
judgment as to subvert the judicial process."' 148
Judges whose belief systems are hard-wired are likely to be eager
lawmakers; those who are pre-committed for reasons of personal advance-
ment may or may not be. In any event, the same qualities that render them
unfit to serve as judges from a traditional perspective, which views law as
143. See Charles Hurt, Support Falters for the "Nuclear Option," WASH. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2005, at Al.
144. Burbank I, supra note 8, at 1999.
145. Id.
146. See Burbank II, supra note 9, at 336.
147. Stephen B. Burbank, The Past and Present of Judicial Independence, 80
JUDICATURE 117, 121 (1996) [hereinafter Burbank X7].
148. Stephen B. Burbank, Is it Time for a National Commission on Judicial Independ-
ence and Accountability?, 73 JUDICATURE 176, 177-78 (1990) [hereinafter Burbank XII],
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determinate knowledge to be discovered, render them equally unfit in a
world that acknowledges the indeterminacy of much (not all) law and the
importance of dialogue in arriving at solutions that serve the common weal.
True believers, no matter what their beliefs or political persuasion, know
what is right, and the brighter, the more self-confident and the more ener-
getic they are, the more likely they are to regard processes and institutions
of dialogue and accountability as obstructions and to endeavor to render
them irrelevant. Non-ideological pre-commitment forecloses dialogue, and
although motivated by a vision of accountability, contributes to its degrada-
tion.
The federal judiciary needs more judges who are politicians in the
sense that Richard Arnold was a politician. These are judges for whom peo-
ple are more important than abstractions, for whom dialogue and deference
are both a two-way street--dialogue and deference involving litigants, other
courts, and the other institutions of government-and for whom processes
and institutions of accountability are viewed not as obstructions but, like the
law itself, as "those wise restraints that make us free.', 14 9 Such people need
not have a background in politics. Indeed, although the example of Judge
Arnold, as of Judge Becker, suggests that political experience can be help-
ful, one can easily imagine a different kind of politics, whether one infected
with ideology of the strong sort or with relentless partisanship, that would
be a handicap.
Today's complex legal landscape cries out not just for judges who re-
nounce the partisan and who are not slaves either to a belief system or to an
identifiable constituency. It also cries out for humility, by which I mean
recognition, in Judge Arnold's words, that "holding . . . a commission
signed by the president does not in and of itself confer moral superiority."'
' 50
To me, humility also entails that, at the end of the day, judges be willing to
abide "irrationality and irresponsibility in the [legislative and executive],
unless it is manifested in behavior that the Constitution, fairly interpreted,
reprehends."151
The need for more federal judges who are adept at the political arts is
by no means confined to the realm of courts. Indeed, the need is equally
acute, much more obvious, and presumably less controversial, in the host of
non-judicial activities in which the modem federal judiciary engages, many
of which bring the judiciary's representatives in contact with elected politi-
cians and their representatives. That was the realm in which Judge Arnold
served for so long and with such distinction as Chair of the Budget Commit-
149. This language is part of the citation read by the president of Harvard University in
conferring the J.D. diploma at commencement. See Burbank 11, supra note 9, at 316 n. 10.
150. Public, supra note 6, at 5.
151. Burbank I, supra note 8, at 2009; see supra text accompanying note 143.
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tee. Judge Arnold's assertion that federal judges "are not accountable in any
way for the results of the cases that [they] decide,"' 52 even if formally cor-
rect, by no means captured the judge's deep respect for processes and insti-
tutions of accountability, fidelity to which, he recognized, is critical to "the
continuing consent of the governed."' 53 No such gloss is required for his
next assertion in the written responses to questions from which the first was
taken, to wit, that "[the federal judiciary is], however, accountable for the
way in which we spend public money, and the political branches of the fed-
eral government are, quite properly, in control of the amount of money we
receive to spend.'
154
The overarching question is how federal courts and the federal judici-
ary can participate in politics without becoming a victim of politics. Robert
Katzmann,155 Charles Geyh, 156 and Judith Resnik' 57 have illuminated some
of the external dilemmas implicating that question, particularly as to com-
munications between the judiciary and Congress.15 8 Aspects of the continu-
ing debate about tiered appellate decisionmaking highlight some internal
dilemmas, and they caution us not to neglect the role that strategic behavior
may play, and the limits of its power, in processes that might otherwise be
viewed as internal.
It will come as no surprise that, just as Judge Arnold deplored the
growth of tiered appellate decisionmaking, so did he deplore-indeed, he
found incredible-rules forbidding citation of opinions in the lower tiers.
1 59
Doubtless he understood that, apart from the impact of such rules on the
ability of lawyers zealously to represent their clients and on the freedom of
expression, 160 they are inimical to judicial accountability. For, although
152. Answers, supra note 109, at 3.
153. Public, supra note 6, at 5. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 112.
154. Answers supra note 109, at 3.
155. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS (1997); JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS: TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL COMrTY (Robert A. Katzmann ed., Brookings Insti-
tution 1988).
156. See Charles G. Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's
Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1996).
157. See Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003).
158. See Discontent, supra note 3, at 774 ("When it was proposed to create a new federal
civil-rights action for gender-based violence, the Judicial Conference initially opposed that.
By the way, there is an important political lesson there, because we got our noses bloodied
when we did it.") (footiote omitted); Future, supra note 3, at 540 (using Judicial Confer-
ence's opposition to Violence against Women Act to illustrate "perils that judges get into
when they get into some sort of quasi-political discourse"); Money, supra note 6, at 28 (judi-
ciary's opposition to having its appropriation subject to the line item veto "is a case study in
what goes wrong when judges get into substantive issues with political overtones").
159. See Discontent, supra note 3, at 778.
160. See id. ("How this can be squared with the First Amendment, I don't know."). See
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modem technology and the requirements of federal law now make it possi-
ble for anyone so motivated (and with adequate resources) to monitor tiered
appellate decisionmaking in most federal courts, 16' no-citation rules reduce
the signals that might prompt such monitoring by the profession, the press,
and the public. They also reduce the psychological pressure on judges-
confronted with their courts' prior decisions and asked to follow, distin-
guish, explain, or disavow them-to monitor themselves.162
Concerned that four (of thirteen) courts of appeals forbid the citation of
their own opinions in the lower tiers for most purposes, including for per-
suasive value-and that they may sanction lawyers who transgress-in
2003 the Committee on Appellate Rules published for comment a proposal
designed to require limited uniformity. 163 Proposed Federal Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 32.1 would prevent courts of appeals from forbidding cita-
tion of opinions, but not, its authors were at pains to stress, from implement-
ing other tiering distinctions, including distinctions as to precedential
status.' 64 The Appellate Rules Committee approved the proposed rule, as
amended, in April 2004 after considering more than 500 written comments
and hearing oral presentations. 165 At its June 2004 meeting, however, the
Standing Committee recommitted the proposal, to the Appellate Rules
Committee for additional consideration, to be informed by empirical
study. 1
66
As one who has long advocated greater reliance on empirical research
in federal court rulemaking, far be it for me to object if a proposal is de-
layed because of genuine concern about costs or benefits that are amenable
also Barnett, supra note 15, at 13 n.56 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533
(2001) as supporting a First Amendment challenge to no-citation rules); William T. Hangley,
Citations Forbidden: A Report and Recommendations of the American College of Trial Law-
yers on the Publication and Citation of Nonbinding Federal Circuit Court Opinions, 208
F.R.D. 645, 690 (2002) ("It is all speculation, and speech should not be strangled on specula-
tion."). For the argument that such rules also conflict with an attorney's duty of candor, see
Goering, supra note 19, at 75-80.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
162. See Barnett, supra note 15, at 16 ("[The case against no-citation rules] asks only that
they be acknowledged and considered. This obligation serves the ends of fairness and consis-
tency, assuring that the prior decision not be rejected without on-the-record consideration
and explanation.") (footnote omitted).
163. For a summary of current practices and a history of the Committee's consideration
of the issues, see Panel Discussion, supra note 67, at _ (Professor Patrick Schiltz).
164. See Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 Advisory Committee Note,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/STO9-2005.pdf#page=5 1.
165. See Minutes of Spring 2004 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 2-
11 (Apr. 13-14, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2004.pdf
[hereinafter Appellate Committee April 2004 Minutes].
166. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting of June 17-18, 2004,
Minutes, at 8-11, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jcO9-2004/JCReport.pdf [here-
inafter Standing Committee Minutes].
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to empirical assessment.' 67 I also understand, however, that calls for more
study can mask unalterable substantive disagreement and/or the desire to
conduct a private burial. 68 Although either or both may have motivated
some of the actors in this case, the reasoned support of the Chair of the
Standing Committee, Judge David Levi, and others 69 for the action taken
ensured that it would not serve merely to delay, let alone to bury, the pro-
posal. Indeed, the Administrative Office completed statistical analyses of
unpublished opinions in courts of appeals that permit citation in January
2005,170 and a preliminary report on the Federal Judicial Center's surveys of
judges, attorneys, and case files (the last to determine how often attorneys
and courts cite unpublished opinions in unrelated cases) became available in
April 2005.' 7
167. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 841 (1993) [hereinafter Burbank XIII]. Would that it had
always. been true that "in dealing with controversial matters ... the rules committees have
consistently sought strong empirical support for proposed amendments." Standing Commit-
tee Minutes, supra note 166, at 10 (Judge Levi); See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transforma-
tion of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1927-
28 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank XIV]; id. at 1928 ("whatever ties some of the original rule-
makers had to the realist movement, most (but not all) of their successors have severed the
empirical cord") (footnotes omitted); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform of Federal
Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 455, 487 (1993) (finding in "at least eighteen
different" sets of amendments between 1939 and 1991 "only one or two instances when the
Committee abandoned the rationalistic approach and sought an empirical predicate for deci-
sion").
168.
[S]ocial science may serve as a substitute for decision-making in that instead of
resolving a difficult problem, a policy-maker may decide simply to study it fur-
ther-perhaps hoping that pressures to resolve the problem or to resolve it in a
particular direction will go away-which sometimes happens.
Richard Lempert, "Between Cup and Lip ": Social Science Influences on Law and Policy, 10
LAW & POL'Y 167, 184 (1988). See Panel Discussion, supra note 67, at _ (Judge Edward
Becker) ("It has become terribly politicized ... But the political forces were so strong that it
was decided, 'Well, let's hold it up and let's do a study."'); Goering, supra note 19, at 87
("the Committee's reaction speaks louder than its words").
169. See Standing Committee Minutes, supra note 166, at 10-11. See also infra note 177
(recommendation of Reporter of Appellate Rules Committee).
170. Memorandum from John K. Rabiej to Judge Samuel A. Alito and Professor Patrick
J. Schiltz (Jan. 10, 2005) (on file with author). According to the author of this memorandum,
the "data shows little or no evidence that the adoption of a permissive citation policy impacts
the median disposition time in either direction." Id. at 1. He also reports that the "data shows
little or no evidence that the adoption of a permissive citation policy impacts the number of
summary dispositions." Id. at 2.
171. See Tim Reagan et al., Citations to Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: Preliminary Report (Federal Judicial Center Apr. 14, 2005). As to the survey of
judges, the authors reported:
Judges in circuits that permit citation to unpublished opinions in unrelated cases
do not think the number of unpublished opinions that they author, the length of
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At its meeting on April 18, the Appellate Rules Committee approved
an amended Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 by a vote of 7-2.172 As reflected
in the minutes of that meeting, both supporters and opponents "agreed that
the [AO and FJC] studies were well done and, at the very least, demon-
strated that the arguments against Rule 32.1 were 'not proven.' ' 173 In addi-
tion, some "members-including one opponent of Rule 32.1-went further
and said that the studies in some respects actually refuted those argu-
ments. 174 In June, the Standing Committee approved the following proposed
rule:
Rule 32.1 Citing Judicial Dispositions
(a) Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation
of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgment, or other written disposi-
tions that have been designated as "unpublished," "not for publication,"
"non-precedential," or the like.
(b) Copies Required. If a party cites a federal judicial opinion, order,
judgment, or other written disposition that is not available in a publicly
accessible electronic database, the party must file and serve a copy of
that opinion, order, judgment, or disposition with the brief or other paper
in which it is cited. 17
5
their unpublished opinions, or the time it takes them to draft unpublished opin-
ions would change if the rules on citing unpublished opinions were to change
[i.e., became more restrictive]. Judges in circuits that recently relaxed their rules
on citation to unpublished opinions reported some increase in such citations, but
no impact on their work.
Judges in circuits that permit citation to unpublished opinions in unrelated cases
report that these citations create only a small amount of additional work and are
seldom inconsistent with published authority, but they are no more than occa-
sionally helpful.
Judges in circuits that forbid citation to unpublished opinions in unrelated cases,
on the other hand, predicted that relaxing the rules on citation to unpublished
opinions will result in shorter opinions or opinions that take longer to prepare.
Id. at 3.
As to the survey of attorneys, the authors reported that "[m]ost attorneys said that a rule
permitting citation to unpublished opinions would not impose a burden on their work, and
most expressed support for such a rule." Id. at 15.
172. Draft Minutes of Spring 2005 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
18 (Apr. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Appellate Committee April 2005 Minutes] (on file with au-
thor). These minutes, which will be available at http://www.uscourts.gov once approved by
the committee in October 2005, contain excellent summaries of the FJC's and AO's research.
See id. at 8-13.
173. Id. at 13.
174. Id.
175. Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Rules 32.1, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf#page=5 1.
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Although empirical data did in fact "better inform the committee," it is
not clear, given the politics of this particular rulemaking proposal, that they
will "take much of the passion out of the debate."'' 76 For the effort to derail
Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 has all the markings of the kind of organized
interest group lobbying campaign1 77 in which the weight of numbers and the
vigor of advocacy are, or so it is hoped, more important than the strength of
the arguments, let alone any evidence, offered in support of the position
advanced. 178
In work that considers federal court rulemaking from an interest group
perspective, I suggested that it would be odd to describe federal judges
and/or the federal judiciary as an interest group when they are engaged in
176. Standing Committee Minutes, supra note 166, at 10 (Judge Levi). The Judicial
Conference approved Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 at its meeting in Sept. 2005, and the
proposal will now be submitted to the Supreme Court. Continuing opposition could derail it
at that stage as it could in Congress if the proposal were promulgated by the Court.
177. As described by the Reporter of the Appellate Rules Committee:
The comments were highly unusual in several respects. First, we received an ex-
traordinarily large number of comments. As noted, we have already received
over 500 comments ... Second, the overwhelming majority of the comments-
close to 95%-pertained only to proposed Rule 32.1. Third, most of the com-
ments on Rule 32.1 came from just one circuit. About 75% of all comments (pro
and con) regarding Rule 32.1 -and about 80% of the comments opposing Rule
32.1-came from judges, clerks, lawyers, and others who work or formerly
worked in the Ninth Circuit. Fourth, the vast majority of the comments on Rule
32.1-about 90%-took the same position. They opposed adopting the rule. Fi-
nally, the comments regarding Rule 32.1 were extremely repetitive. Many re-
peated-word-for-word-the same basic "talking points" distributed by oppo-
nents of the rule, and many letters were identical or nearly identical copies of
each other.
Memorandum from Patrick J. Schiltz, Reporter, to Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
1-2 (Mar. 18, 2004) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) (on file with author). See id. at 1-
2 n. 1 (stating that "almost all of the twenty-one law professors who wrote to oppose Rule
32.1 had clerked for Ninth Circuit judges" and that "many of the commentators from outside
of the Ninth Circuit were also former Ninth Circuit law clerks or were inspired to write be-
cause of Ninth Circuit connections"); id. at 91 ("I recognize, of course, that most of the op-
position to Rule 32.1 came from one circuit, where a campaign against the rule was led by
some of that circuit's judges.").
178. See id. at 92 ("Some of the arguments against Rule 32.1 strike me as clearly incor-
rect."); id. ("Other arguments against Rule 32.1 are internally inconsistent."); id ("Still other
arguments against Rule 32.1 suffer from gaps in their reasoning."); id. at 93 ("This paragraph
basically repeats the same assertion three times. The assertion may very well be true, but
repetition does not make it so."); id. at 93 ("many of the arguments against Rule 32.1 were
exaggerated"); id. at 93 ("What most struck me about the arguments against Rule 32.1 is that
they sometimes made a better normative casefor Rule 32.1 than the arguments of the rule's
supporters."). It should be noted that, his views about the merits of the opposition to Rule
32.1 notwithstanding, Professor Schiltz's personal recommendation was "that the Committee
remove Rule 32.1 from its study agenda or, if the committee thinks it would be worthwhile,
postpone further action on Rule 32.1 to give the F[ederal] J[udicial] C[enter] time to study
the empirical claims made by the supporters and opponents alike." Id. at 95.
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lawmaking (rulemaking) under the Enabling Act. 179 I also suggested, how-
ever, that the judiciary's undoubted role as an interest group in its relations
with Congress and the Executive may influence "the effectuation of indi-
vidual or institutional judicial interests in rulemaking."'' 80 The political his-
tory of Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 may call for a revision of my views on
the first proposition, and it reinforces the suggestion, in the second, that
participation in an interactive lawmaking process can induce strategic be-
havior.
It is clear that opponents of the proposed rule, led by Judge Kozin-
ski,181 organized a massive letter writing campaign in an effort to defeat it.
That campaign yielded "more than 500 public comments,"18 2 prompting the
Chair of the Standing Committee to observe that "the proposed rule was
very controversial"' I8 3 and that "the sheer size of the body of comments was
daunting. ' ' 84 However, he added that "many of the comments seemed to
copy each other."'185 A member of the committee "noted that he had been
struck by how strongly a number of judges feel about the issue,"'186 while
several cited "the great sensitivity of the issue among circuit judges."'8 7 One
of them "added that there were powerful arguments in favor of the proposed
amendment, but that it would be a mistake institutionally to go forward with
a rule that has generated so much opposition."' 88
It is also clear that, in waging their lobbying campaign against Pro-
posed Appellate Rule 32.1, opponents have not confined themselves to writ-
ten communications or oral testimony that are part of the official record.
Judge Kozinski and others made off-record attempts to influence the Appel-
late Rules Committee, 189 and similar efforts, including telephone call to
lawyer members, were made to influence the Standing Committee.'90
179. See Burbank V, supra note 11, at 1715.
180. Id. See id. at 1717.
181. Judge Kozinski's letter to the Appellate Rules Committee has been published. Alex
Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 51 FED.
LAW. 36 (2004). For a reply, see Stephen R. Barnett, In Support of Proposed Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1: A Reply to Judge Alex Kozinsti, 51 FED. LAW. 32 (2004).
182. Id. at 8 (Judge Alito).
183. Id. at 10 (Judge Levi).
184. Id. at 9.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 10.
187. Standing Committee Minutes, supra note 169, at 10.
188. Id.
189.
Mr. Letter said that the Justice Department had originally asked the committee to
approve a citation rule and continues to favor such a rule. However, the Solicitor
General received a phone call Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit and
other opponents of the rule, and he is troubled by some of the concerns that they
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The extent to which off-record communications, written or oral, occur
(and their influence) in federal court rulemaking is a subject of my on-going
research. I expect that such communications are common between judges,
and I doubt that, from the perspective of influence (or the appearance of
influence) divorced from reason, they are often likely to prove a source of
serious concern. 19' I am less sanguine, from that perspective, about such
communications between judges who are not members of the rulemaking
committees and non-judge members of those committees, particularly if the
members practice before the judges who are lobbying them. Moreover, that
is probably not the only relevant perspective from which to view off-record
communications in a process that is dominated by judges, which raises the
question of how, if at all, the norms of court rule-making are, or should be,
different from those of judicial decisionmaking.
The elaborate and relatively transparent processes of modem federal
court rulemaking, like the processes of modem administrative law, can be
viewed as conferring legitimacy on the enterprise or as preventing arbitrary
action. 192 Those processes do in any event afford ample opportunities for
interest groups and others potentially affected by proposed action to monitor
the rulemakers. A different choice of perspective is likely to affect one's
assessment of the strategic implications of such monitoring. Thus, the op-
portunities for monitoring can be seen as an advantage to interest groups
with the resources and political clout to overturn the results of action by the
rulemakers that has been reported to Congress under the Rules Enabling
Act. 93 Alternatively, when the processes themselves are considered, active
raised. The Solicitor General believes it essential that this Committee fully con-
sult with the Ninth Circuit regarding its concerns.
Minutes of Fall 2002 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 35 (Nov. 18,
2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules. At the same meeting, an unidentified
lawyer member "argued strongly against approving any rule regarding the citation of prece-
dential opinions. He said that, although he had previously favored such a rule, he had been
persuaded by discussions with Judge Kozinski and others from the Ninth Circuit that no such
rule should be approved." Id. at 36.
190. Telephone interview with David Bernick, Esq. (May 9, 2005) (on file with author).
191. Possible exceptions concern communications from (1) the Chief Justice (who makes
all appointments) to members of rules committees, and (2) members of a court that reviews
decisions by judicial members of such committees.
192. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461 (2003). For an interesting and useful un-
packing of the concept of "legitimacy" in constitutional debates, see Fallon, supra note 114.
In a brief section on legislative, presidential, and administrative legitimacy, Professor Fallon
notes that "debates about the legal legitimacy of administrative adjudication and rulemaking
never wholly disappear," id. at 1842 (footnote omitted), while "administrative agencies are
widely believed to face a serious, even alarming sociological legitimacy deficit." Id. at 1844
(footnote omitted).
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2000). Cf Elizabeth Garrett, Interest Groups and Public
Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 137 (2000) (exploring how institutional struc-
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monitoring can be seen to insulate the rulemakers, both by disciplining the
form and content of interest group participation and by creating a record of
reasoned response.194
There is nothing surprising about disagreement on some issues of mu-
tual concern among members of an interest group, and the existence of or-
ganizations advocating the interests of discrete sub-groups within the fed-
eral judiciary has long called into question the appropriateness of lumping
federal judges together for all purposes. 95 The judiciary endeavors to speak
with one voice in its relations with other institutions of government, 196 but
Article III protections (if not the First Amendment) effectively prevent its
leadership from requiring adherence, as it were, to the party line.
The rulemakers are understandably leery of controversy, particularly
since the early 1990's, when the Supreme Court, embroiled in a rulemaking
controversy involving foreign governments, asked that future reports includ-
ing proposed rules or amendments include a statement of contentious is-
sues. 19 7 At one time the existence of controversy functioned as a proxy for
possible invalidity under the Enabling Act, remitting decisions about pro-
spective federal regulation to Congress, 98 and, although the rulemakers
have been more careful about the limits of their mandate in recent years, the
ture affects behavior in politics and noting the potential ability of well-financed interest
groups "to manipulate the more open system to their advantage"); Joseph Smith, Congress
Opens the Courthouse Doors: Statutory Changes to Judicial Review Under the Clean Air
Act, 58 POL. Sci. RES. Q. 139, 144 (2005) (1977 statutory change requiring EPA to permit
oral presentations "allowed interested groups to place information in the rulemaking record
that could help them in later challenges to EPA regulations.").
194. Cf Stephen P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (2000)
(in response to interest group, capture and public choice accounts of regulation, arguing for
attention to "administrator ideology and administrative procedure as determinants of regula-
tory outcomes"); Stephen P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administra-
tive Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (assessing four main theories of the regulatory
state in light of administrative process expectations for each and contesting the inevitability
of regulatory failure once the administrative process is taken into account). Professor Croley
suggests that Congress may use administrative procedure to insulate itself from interest
groups. See Croley, Public Interested Regulation, supra, at 7. That is an apt way to describe
one of Congress' purposes in the 1988 legislation requiring greater transparency in the rule-
making process. See Burbank V, supra note 11, at 1724.
195. See, e.g., Conference Represents Federal Trial Judges, THE THiRD BRANCH, June
2003, at 10-13 (interview with Chief Judge Irene M. Keeler, N.D. W. Va., Chair of the Na-
tional Conference of Federal Trial Judges, Judicial Division, American Bar Association).
196. See id. ("our public position never conflicts with any official policy adopted by the
Judicial Conference"); Burbank V, supra note 11, at 1733-34 n.254.
197. See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 843 (1993).
198. See Jonathan Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer
Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 857 (1974);
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1191 n.751,
1192 n.759 (1982).
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proxy function remains a possibility so long as statutory limitations on the
rulemaking enterprise are indeterminate. Yet, the increasing involvement of
interest groups in court rulemaking, coupled with Congress' awareness of
the power of procedure and its political potential, 99 augurs quite a different
view of, and role for, controversy, one that attends to its strategic utility ex
ante instead of its meaning ex post.
The history of Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 suggests that the rule
makers need to confront both the potential and the limitations of strategic
behavior intended to defeat a proposal. Wrapped up in that question for
rulemakers who are judges is the additional question of the extent to which
the enterprise should be conducted according to norms different from those
to which they have been socialized as judges. In confronting these ques-
tions, however, the rulemakers may find that the Rule 32.1 history is valu-
able more for the light cast by its exceptionalism than it is as representative
of rulemaking normal. In particular, they should consider the messages that
caving to internal group politics may send to other groups, to Congress, and
to the public.
If a campaign noted more for its passion and repetitiveness than for the
strength of its arguments or its support in documented experience sufficed
to block or indefinitely delay a proposal for which reasoned arguments were
very powerful, would others notice that heat triumphed over light because it
was generated by judges? Would they also notice that the triumph could
have had nothing to do with the fear of congressional override, there being
no reasonable possibility that the body that enacted the E-Government Act
of 2002 would disapprove a change intended to enhance transparency and
likely to improve the accountability of the judiciary? 200 If they did notice,
what impact would that have on perceptions of the processes of modem
court rulemaking as either conferring legitimacy or guarding against arbi-
trary action? More important, if they did not notice, what impact would the
history of Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 have on the future conduct of those
who neither receive the same level of deference from, nor accord it to, the
judges who dominate court rulemaking?
Finally, what impact would the triumph of the interests of a vocal judi-
cial minority have on Congress's views of court rulemaking? If those frus-
trated by the (hypothetical) defeat of Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 (which,
after all, was put on the agenda at the behest of the Solicitor General)20 1
sought direct legislative action from Congress, why should that body defer
199. See Burbank V, supra note 11, at 1706-14, 1737.
200. See supra text accompanying note 20. "Crucial to the efficacy of an information
system for controlling abuses of power is that control over it not be limited to power-
wielders and the entities that originally authorized their actions." Grant & Keohane, supra
note 27, at 41.
201. See Panel Discussion, supra note 67, at _(Professor Patrick Schiltz).
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to "The Enabling Act Process? '20 2 More generally, why should Congress
trust the rulemakers to advance the "public interest," rather, for instance,
than the narrow interests of the federal judiciary, or worse, the interest
groups from which the members of the rules committees emerged?
20 3
At the least, the history of Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 suggests that,
prior to the development of an institutional position, the rulemakers need to
attend to the use of the techniques of interest group politics by different
groups of judges, whether or not they are regarded as constituting different
interest groups. In doing so, I expect, it will be helpful to distinguish be-
tween the political arts of Richard Arnold and those of Tom Delay:
"Suaviter in modo, fortiter in re," which, as roughly translated by Judge
Arnold, means "[g]ently in manner, strongly in matter or substance. '2°
IV. CONCLUSION
Both facets of Richard Arnold's career that I have chosen as my focus
prompt inquiry about the proper roles of federal judges and of the federal
judiciary. My inquiry has sought to avoid platitudes and rose color glasses,
to take seriously, as Judge Arnold took seriously, the importance of judicial
accountability to the quality of judicial independence, and to pay close at-
tention to politics and power. Perhaps it was Judge Arnold's experience as a
legislative assistant that made him a realist about power. I believe that, as a
realist, he would have agreed with one of the conclusions of my recent
study of procedural regulation in the federal courts:
In the current political climate-perhaps the most poisonous in forty
years for the relationship between Congress and the federal judiciary-
there is reason for concern about adherence to long-standing customs or
norms and hence about resort to blunt instruments of influence or con-
trol by members of Congress determined to work their will on the fed-
eral courts and to "take no prisoners" in the process. The proper re-
sponse is not-it cannot be-assertions of power that does not exist. The
202. See Burbank V, supra note 11, at 1731-34, 1737-39.
203. But see Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, De-
mocratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999). This article fails to
turn the light of public choice and other theories of human behavior on the process it recom-
mends. The author does not consider the judicial utility function or the potential ideological
cast of rulemakers all of whom have been appointed by a highly visible political figure, the
Chief Justice of the United States.
204.
I like to recall a line from Lord Chesterfield's letters to his son. Lord Chester-
field gave his son some general advice about how to conduct himself toward
others. The advice was, "Suaviter in modo, fortiter in re." Now that means, in
rough translation, "Gently in manner, strongly in matter or substance."
Public, supra note 6, at 5.
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federal judiciary not only lacks a purse and a sword; its shield is very
narrow. Wiser heads must prevail, and, if necessary, informed public
opinion must be brought to bear on those who are ignorant of, or choose
not to heed, the lessons of our constitutional history.
20 5
I know that his exemplary career was on my mind as I wrote those words,
just as it is on my mind as I contemplate the state of the federal judiciary
and "the breakdown in the norms of institutional respect and accommoda-
tion" that is "a defining characteristic of contemporary politics."
20 6
I have called on the federal judiciary to lead, if only by example, an ef-
fort to recivilize politics:
The notion that the judiciary might take the lead in reestablishing such a
politics--of "custom, dialogue, compromise, and statesmanship"-will
come as a shock only to those who believe that politics and law, like ju-
dicial independence and accountability, are irreconcilable, or those
whose exposure to politically feckless judges has caused them to forget
those who are adepts.20 7
Richard Arnold was an adept at the politics of judging and the politics of the
judiciary, and it would help if other federal judges followed his example. It
would thus help if the Supreme Court were less inclined to posterity-
worship 20 8 and institutional self-aggrandizement. 209 One can only wonder
whether the Court might not be different, and all of us better off, in these
205. Burbank V, supra note 11, at 1734-35 (footnotes omitted).
Rather than waging a losing battle about power, far better to seek to forestall ir-
rationality and irresponsibility through genuine dialogue, informed and nour-
ished by the respect that is due to all branches of government and that is required
if we are to honor the genius of those who fought and died for our liberty.
Id. at 1735-36.
206. Id. at 1736.
If our political life in general, and the interaction of governmental institutions in
particular, is marked by mutual respect and a willingness to defer to others, we
stand a substantial chance of never again facing a case like [Ex parte Merryman,
17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487)]-or a civil war. If we lose those
characteristics... these risks increase.
Hartnett, supra note 15, at 159.
207. Burbank V, supra note 11, at 1742-43 (footnotes omitted).
208. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
209. See, e.g., Peter W. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-
Hostages, "Orderly Shutdowns," Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial "Coups," 12
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 503, 510 (2003) (noting that of "151 federal statutes declared
unconstitutional in whole or part by the Court between 1789 and June 2000, forty--over
twenty-six percent-were declared unconstitutional since 1981"); Michael W. McConnell,
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARv. L. REv.
153, 163 (1997) (noting that Boerne represents a "startlingly strong view ofjudicial suprem-
acy"); Hartnett, supra note 15, at 123-26.
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respects had Richard Arnold spent a portion of his judicial career where he
belonged.

